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Preface
The Treaty of Lisbon endowed the European Union with an express competence 
in the field of humanitarian aid, a competence which it shares with the Member 
States. Acknowledging the important role which the EU had already played in 
the field, this codification has turned humanitarian aid into a full-fledged EU 
external policy, based on its own principles and objectives. At the same time, the 
formal inclusion of humanitarian aid into the EU external action framework 
entails new institutional and policy challenges.  
In this timely report, Peter van Elsuwege, Jan Orbie and Fabienne Bossuyt 
recall the incremental development of a EU humanitarian policy, and decrypt 
the ramifications of its ‘constitutionalisation’. Bringing out the tension between 
the specificity of humanitarian aid, in terms of status, principles and objectives, 
and the general coherence imperative which governs the EU external action; the 
analysis also identifies several ways to address its implications. 
This study is the sixth report SIEPS publishes in the context of its research 
project The EU external action and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Eva Sjögren
Director
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Executive summary1 
The aim of this report is to map out the distinctive features of EU humanitarian 
aid as a separate external policy of the EU before analysing how this can be 
reconciled with the ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty to make the EU a more 
coherent external actor.
The EU’s humanitarian aid policy has progressively expanded over the past 
decades. It started in the framework of relations with the ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) group of countries and without an explicit legal basis 
in the Treaties. The creation of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid 
Office (ECHO), a separate institutional service for humanitarian aid, in 1991 
contributed to the growing recognition of humanitarian assistance as a specific 
and important external policy. However, the political and legal foundations of this 
policy remained very weak. In 1996, Council Regulation 1257/96 was adopted 
under the disputable legal basis of development cooperation, and ECHO failed 
to operate as a truly independent institutional structure throughout the 1990s. 
In this context, the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003) proposed 
the introduction of a specific Treaty provision devoted to humanitarian aid in 
order to strengthen the elaboration of a more professional and independent 
humanitarian aid policy at the EU level. The eventual non-ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty did not mean the end for the recognition of the specificity 
of humanitarian aid within the EU’s external action. The Lisbon Treaty literally 
recycled the Constitutional Treaty’s humanitarian aid provisions. Moreover, in 
December 2007, the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council jointly adopted the “European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”. 
Accordingly, the EU’s humanitarian aid policy can build upon a solid legal and 
political framework. 
Article 214 TFEU not only codifies the EU’s competence to act in the field 
of humanitarian aid, but also underlines the importance of respect for the key 
principles derived from international humanitarian law as a crucial precondition 
for the implementation of the EU’s humanitarian activities. Nevertheless, the 
new Treaty provision also creates new challenges as far as respect for those 
principles is concerned. NGOs active in the field of humanitarian assistance have 
1 This report is partly based upon: P. Van Elsuwege and J. Orbie, ‘The EU’s Humanitarian Aid 
Policy after Lisbon: Implications of a New Treaty Basis’, in: I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds.), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Boston-
Leiden: Brill, 2014), 20-45 and J. Orbie, P. Van Elsuwege and F. Bossuyt, ‘Humanitarian Aid 
as an Integral Part of the European Union’s External Action: The Challenge of Reconciling 
Coherence and Independence’, 22 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 3 (2014), 
158-165. We are grateful to Christophe Hillion, Inge Govaere, Sara Poli, Kathrin Schick, 
Thomas Henökl and two anonymous referees for their valuable feedback on previous versions of 
this report.
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raised concerns that the political inspiration for the establishment of a European 
Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EVHC), as well as the integration of 
the EU’s humanitarian aid policy within the general framework of the EU’s 
external action and the comprehensive approach to crisis management, might 
negatively affect the independence of the EU’s humanitarian action and strain 
its commitment to the humanitarian principles.
In principle, there are sufficient safeguards to protect the independence of the 
EU’s humanitarian operations. Decision-making in the field of humanitarian 
aid is still essentially steered within Directorate General (DG) ECHO of the 
Commission. The integration of civil protection functions in the activities of 
DG ECHO has improved the coherence of the EU’s strategy for crisis response, 
and relations with the European External Action Service (EEAS) do not appear 
to have undermined the fundamental role of the humanitarian principles. 
Nevertheless, several outstanding issues continue to exist. 
First, the trend towards a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, 
including a more active coordinating role for the EEAS, may lead to further 
institutional tensions with DG ECHO. A clear-cut division of responsibilities, 
as well as a sufficient awareness of the humanitarian aid specificities among all 
of the actors, are crucial to ensuring effective cooperation both at the policy 
level and on the ground. A revision of Regulation 1257/96 and the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid could be useful to more clearly spell out the 
independent and coordinating role of DG ECHO and its relations with other 
institutional actors such as the EEAS.
Secondly, there still has been little practical progress on linking emergency aid, 
rehabilitation and development. Also in this area, it is important that all of the 
actors involved, both in Brussels and in the delegations, understand each other’s 
principles, objectives and modalities, and agree on a common framework for 
action.
Thirdly, the ambition of the Lisbon Treaty to facilitate the combination of 
different policy instruments in response to global emergencies faces political 
and legal obstacles. This is clearly illustrated by the EU’s response to the floods 
in Pakistan in 2010, where the temporary introduction of autonomous trade 
preferences faced strong opposition both within the EU and at the level of the 
WTO. 
In sum, the EU has created a solid legal and political framework for humanitarian 
aid policy over the past decade. It appears that the EU is a key player when it 
comes to providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance. It has also strongly 
supported the humanitarian principles. However, difficulties remain regarding 
the integration of humanitarian aid programmes into more comprehensive 
strategies of disaster response. Although the post-Lisbon framework includes 
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several safeguards protecting the specificity of the EU‘s humanitarian aid policy, 
the trend towards a more comprehensive approach to emergency situations puts 
the humanitarian principles under pressure. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) has a long tradition of providing humanitarian 
assistance and is one of the world’s largest donors of humanitarian aid.2 
Providing aid to address the needs of people struck by natural and man-made 
disasters contributes to the EU’s profile as an international actor and is a crucial 
component of its “civilian power”.3 Therefore, it may be somewhat paradoxical 
that a specific provision devoted to humanitarian aid was introduced in the 
Union’s primary legal framework only with the Treaty of Lisbon. Pursuant to 
Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(see Annex 1), the granting of “ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for 
people in third countries who are victims of natural and man-made disasters” 
is now explicitly recognised as an EU external policy in its own right. This new 
legal basis complements Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian 
aid4 and the “European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”, which was adopted in 
December 2007 as a Joint Statement of the Council, the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and the Member States.5 
The combined reading of Regulation 1257/96, Article 214 TFEU and the European 
Consensus reveals the specific characteristics of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy. 
Whereas the scope of this policy, i.e. tackling the humanitarian consequences of 
natural or man-made disasters, such as floods, drought, earthquakes, volcano 
eruptions, tsunami, civil war, state failure or ethnic cleansing, may be considered 
to be very broad,6 there are also important limitations. First, humanitarian aid 
is limited to emergencies in third countries. Disaster relief within the EU is 
subject to the solidarity clause in Article 222 TFEU.7 This distinction has been 
2 In 2013, the European Commission alone provided humanitarian assistance to more than 124 
million people in 90 countries outside of the EU, for a total amount of € 1.35 billion. Together, 
the EU and its Member States provide over half of the global funding for humanitarian aid. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/annual_report/2013/COM_2014_537_
en.pdf. 
3 It is, therefore, no surprise that the European Commission is actively involved in the 
preparations for the first World Humanitarian Summit, which will be organised in Istanbul 
on 23-24 May 2016. See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-
cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit_en.
4 Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, [1996] OJ L163/1. Remarkably, this 
Regulation was adopted on the legal basis of former Article 130w of the EC Treaty (later Art. 
179 EC; now Art. 209 TFEU) relating to development cooperation. On the problems regarding 
this choice of legal basis, see infra at part 2.2.
5 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, [2008] OJ C25/1. 
6 A. Dashwood, ‘Conflicts of Competence in Responding to Global Emergencies’, in: A. 
Antoniadis, R. Schütze and E. Spaventa (eds.), The European Union and Global Emergencies. A 
Law and Policy Analysis (Oxford: Hart, 2011), 38.
7 For comments, see: S. Blockmans, ‘L’Union fait la force: Making the Most of the Solidarity 
Clause (Article 222 TFEU’, in: I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds.), EU Management of Global 
Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises (Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2014), 
111-136.
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made very explicit after the European Council called for concrete proposals 
from the Commission “to the put in place the capacity for humanitarian aid 
internally” in response to the refugee crisis.8 Proceeding from the observation 
that Article 214 TFEU “can only be relied upon to adopt measures assisting 
affected people in third countries”, the Commission drafted its proposal for 
a new Council Regulation on the provision of emergency support within the 
Union on the legal basis of Article 222 (1) TFEU.9 Second, measures adopted 
under Article 214 TFEU are designed to provide ad hoc support in the event 
of emergencies, whereas long-term and structural assistance fall under either 
Article 208 TFEU (development cooperation) or Article 212 TFEU (economic, 
financial and technical cooperation). Third, EU humanitarian aid is confined to 
addressing “humanitarian needs”. In this respect, it differs from civil protection 
cooperation, which is another tool at the disposal of the EU to provide relief 
assistance to people faced with the immediate consequences of natural or man-
made disasters. The latter is based on Article 196 TFEU and can be mobilised 
both internally within the EU and in third countries. It typically focuses on 
search and rescue operations and often includes technical types of assistance such 
as firefighting (in case of forest fires), pumping capacity (floods), ships to combat 
pollution (oil spills) and detection and decontamination facilities (chemical, 
biological or nuclear incidents).10 Last but not least, the EU’s humanitarian 
aid policy is based on specific principles, which are derived from international 
humanitarian law. Despite slight differences in the formulation of those core 
principles,11 they essentially reflect the so-called “humanitarian imperative”, 
meaning that assistance is offered to prevent or restrict human suffering, 
irrespective of any political considerations. It follows that, in contrast to civil 
protection, EU humanitarian aid cannot be used as a tool for facilitating and 
supporting Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) crisis management 
operations.12 The humanitarian principles are considered to be “an operational 
necessity helping to provide access to assistance, to protect the most vulnerable 
and to ensure the security of humanitarian workers”.13
The implementation of an independent EU humanitarian aid policy – meaning 
autonomous from economic, political and military considerations – faces 
8 European Council Conclusions, 18-19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16. 
9 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the provision of emergency 
support within the Union, COM (2016) 115 final. 
10 For comments, see: F. Fink Hooijer, ‘The EU’s Competence in the Field of Civil Protection’, in: 
Govaere and Poli, op. cit., 137-146.
11 Article 214 (2) TFEU refers to “impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination” as fundamental 
principles guiding the EU’s humanitarian aid, whereas the European Consensus refers to 
“humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence”. For an analysis of those differences, see 
infra section 3.2.
12 The European Consensus explicitly states that “EU humanitarian aid is not a crisis management 
tool”, para. 15. 
13 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Towards 
the World Humanitarian Summit: A global partnership for principled and effective humanitarian 
action’, COM (2015) 419 final, p. 3.
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numerous challenges. First, the term “humanitarian” is often (ab)used in 
other contexts, creating the risk that its essential feature of impartiality will be 
undermined. For instance, the notion of “humanitarian intervention” involves 
the threat and use of military force in order to halt or avert large-scale human 
suffering.14 Hence, this concept is disconnected from the understanding of 
“humanitarian aid”. Nevertheless, the involvement of EU Member States 
in humanitarian interventions – even when they are not acting under an EU 
mandate – almost unavoidably interferes with the perception of the EU as an 
independent donor. Second, humanitarian assistance is particularly challenging 
in relation to disputed areas. This is clearly illustrated by the conflict in the 
eastern part of Ukraine. Both the EU and Russia are offering humanitarian aid 
to Ukrainian civilians, but the parties regard each other’s efforts as foreign policy 
actions.15 Third, the humanitarian principles are not uncontested. It has been 
argued that humanitarian aid simply cannot be apolitical and neutral, because 
it cannot be disconnected from the political context in which it is provided. 
Moreover, the desirability of a principle-driven humanitarian approach has 
been under discussion.16 Providing access and assistance to people in need may 
require negotiations with dictatorial regimes and armed non-state actors, thus 
providing them power and legitimacy.17 At worst, humanitarian aid may have 
unintended consequences. For instance, humanitarian assistance provided to 
Rwandan genocidaires residing in refugee camps in 1994 only aggravated the 
suffering and killing of people.18 More recently, there have been reports that ISIS 
abuses humanitarian aid provided by international humanitarian organisations 
to strengthen its presence in the region.19 Fourth, given the close connection 
between the origins of a humanitarian crisis (a civil war, natural disaster, extreme 
poverty, etc.) and its consequences (large numbers of displaced people, social and 
economic difficulties), humanitarian aid is almost always closely related to other 
policy areas. As a result, ensuring coherence in its response to crisis situations, 
while safeguarding the specific characteristics of humanitarian aid, is a crucial 
concern for the EU. This has particularly been the case since the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty. On the one hand, the introduction of Article 214 TFEU 
underlines the separate nature of humanitarian aid as a self-standing external 
14 On the concept of “humanitarian intervention” see, e.g., A. Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention. 
An Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2010). 
15 N. Paukov, ‘Ukraine calls Russian aid convoy act of cynicism’, Moscow Times, 13 August 2014. 
16 See e.g. C. Dany, ‘Politicization of Humanitarian Aid in the European Union’, European Foreign 
Affairs Review (2015), 425; J. Gross Stein, ‘In the Eye of the Storm: Humanitarian NGOs, 
Complex Emergencies and Conflict Resolution’, Peace and Conflict Studies (2001).  
17 A clear example of this “humanitarian dilemma” is the attempt of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) to build a relationship with the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) 
in the hope of helping some 10 million people who live in ISIS-controlled areas. See: J. 
Moore, ‘Red Cross attempting to build relationship with ISIS to help those under its control’, 
Newsweek, 7 December 2015. 
18 See e.g. the critical book of L. Polman, War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times 
(London: Penguin Books, 2011).
19 A. Rosen, ‘Here’s how ISIS abuses humanitarian aid’, at: http://uk.businessinsider.com/how-isis-
abuses-humanitarian-aid-2015-2 
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policy. On the other hand, the institutional and legal innovations of the Lisbon 
Treaty essentially aim to increase the coherence of the EU’s external activities.20 
This is, amongst other things, reflected through the inclusion of a single set 
of external action objectives in Article 21 TEU and the explicit provision in 
Article 214 (1) TFEU that the EU’s humanitarian activities “shall be conducted 
within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external action of 
the Union”. 
The spirit of the Lisbon Treaty resulted in the elaboration of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises.21 The latter aims to 
better link the various EU policies and capacities on the basis of a shared vision 
and common objectives. At the same time, it is recognised that “humanitarian 
aid shall be provided in accordance with its specific modus operandi, respectful 
of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, solely 
on the basis of the needs of affected populations, in line with the European 
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”.22 In other words, reconciling the specific 
features of humanitarian aid and the ambition to establish more coherence 
between its external policies is of fundamental importance for the EU’s post-
Lisbon response to emergency situations. 
This report examines how the EU has coped with the identified challenges in 
practice. It does not intend to assess the impact or the effectiveness of the EU’s 
activities in the field of humanitarian aid; instead, the report is essentially a 
stocktaking exercise, mapping out the key features of the legal, institutional and 
political framework of the EU’s post-Lisbon humanitarian aid policy. It also aims 
to synthetise the relatively limited academic literature and the available primary 
documents on EU humanitarian aid policy, setting the stage for further research 
into its effectiveness in specific cases. After analysing the historical development 
of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy (1) and its specific characteristics under 
Article 214 TFEU (2), the issue of coherence is addressed from an institutional 
(3) and substantive (4) dimension. The institutional dimension spells out 
the interaction between the various actors involved in the formulation and 
implementation of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy. The substantive dimension 
provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between humanitarian aid and 
three other external policy domains, namely crisis management, development 
and trade. Based on an analysis of policy documents and legal texts, we explore 
whether and how the two policy goals of the Lisbon Treaty (independent 
humanitarian aid and increased policy coherence) are pursued together. It is 
argued that the post-Lisbon framework includes several safeguards protecting 
the specificity of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy. Nevertheless, the trend 
20 P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a 
New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 987-1019. 
21 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, JOIN (2013) 30 final. 
22 Ibid., 4.
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towards a more comprehensive approach to emergency situations puts the 
humanitarian principles under pressure. The conclusions end with a number of 
recommendations about how these challenges can be addressed. 
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2 The gradual development 
of an EU humanitarian 
aid policy
The European Union’s humanitarian aid policy goes back a long time. This section 
provides an overview of the gradual expansion and institutionalisation of the EU’s 
humanitarian aid policy over the past decades. It is structured chronologically 
around three phases: the historical antecedents to the establishment of the 
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)23 in 1991 (2.1), the 
first decade of ECHO’s functioning in the 1990s (2.2), and the evolutions since 
the 2000s, most notably with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid 
and the Lisbon Treaty provisions (2.3). 
2.1 From Yaoundé II until the creation of ECHO
Historical antecedents
The EU has a long-standing policy in relation to developing countries. Part 
IV of the Treaty of Rome contained a separate Part IV on the “Association 
of the Overseas Countries and Territories” of the Member States. However, 
humanitarian aid was not mentioned in the EU’s founding treaties. It was 
only after the independence of the Member States’ colonies that the European 
Economic Community (EEC), for the first time, engaged in this domain. 
Specifically, Article 20 of the second Yaoundé Convention (1969) with the 
AASM (Association of the Associated African States and Madagascar) refers 
to “exceptional aid”. The purpose was rather limited: providing emergency aid 
to the governments of AASM countries suffering from exceptional economic 
difficulties (e.g. collapsing commodity prices) or natural disasters (e.g. floods or 
famine). 
One decade later, the scope would be extended through the second Lomé 
Convention (Article 254) with the ACP group (African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries). First, in addition to economic and natural emergencies, man-
made disasters, notably civil wars and ethnic conflict, could be addressed. The 
category of “exceptional aid” was replaced by the concept of “emergency aid”.24 
To date, this remains an important (though often blurred) distinction, e.g. 
23 Originally, ECHO stood for “European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid”, then it was 
changed to “European Community Humanitarian Office”, and later, “European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid Office”. Since 2010, ECHO has been the European Commission’s office for 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection.
24 G. Scappucci, The Humanitarian Aid of the EU: “Alibi”, “Smokescreen” or “Solidarity in Action”? 
(Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1998), 30.
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when determining whether DG ECHO or the EEAS should take the lead in an 
emergency situation.25 
Second, this humanitarian assistance would go directly to the victims and 
not to the national government of the ACP country.26 On the one hand, this 
brought the European Community’s humanitarian aid policy more in line 
with the international humanitarian principles, emphasising the apolitical and 
independent nature of humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the bypassing 
of national governments also mirrored the EU’s changing approach towards 
violations of democracy and human rights by the late 1970s.27 Whereas the 
first Lomé Agreement put a lot of emphasis on the sovereignty of the newly 
independent ACP countries, political issues such as the atrocities under Idi 
Amin’s regime in Uganda provoked a more critical stance by the Community. To 
date, the EU’s humanitarian aid has mainly been distributed through specialised 
international non-governmental organisations (e.g. Red Cross) and international 
institutions (e.g. UN agencies such as UNICEF). Humanitarian aid for the ACP 
countries was financed by the European Development Fund (EDF).
Moreover, in 1971, the European Parliament had already created a separate 
budgetary line for humanitarian aid. This applied to all of the developing 
countries, including those that were not former colonies of the Member States, 
thereby further extending the geographical reach of the EEC humanitarian aid 
provision. This was also in line with general trends whereby from the 1970s 
onwards, the Community started to develop external relations with countries 
that did not belong to the immediate neighbourhood or the former colonies 
of the Member States.28 In addition, separate aid instruments were created for 
“aid for refugees and displaced persons” (managed by DG VIII – Development) 
and “emergency food aid” (DG VI – Agriculture).29 However, it was not until 
the early 1990s that the EU’s humanitarian aid policy became more visible and 
institutionalised.
The creation of ECHO: a specific institutional service for humanitarian aid
Based on the recommendations of a European Commission Task Force on the 
improvement of emergency aid activities, the Commissioners then in charge of 
external relations established ECHO in November 1991.30 This new service was 
located within the Commission and was exclusively dedicated to the management 
25 For more on this point, see Section 4 below.
26 H. Versluys, European Humanitarian Aid Policy From a Political Science Perspective: An Analysis of 
Delegation and Coherence (Ghent University, Doctoral Dissertation, 2008), 9.
27 K.E. Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003), 97-101.
28 M. Holland and M. Doidge, Development Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 3.
29 Scappucci, op. cit., 31.
30 European Commission Decision to set up a European Office for Humanitarian Aid, P/91/69, 
06/11/1991
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of humanitarian assistance. To date, the acronym ECHO is associated with the 
EU’s humanitarian aid policy, although its meaning and institutional position 
have changed several times.31 
The creation of ECHO can be explained by a combination of five interrelated 
factors.32 First, the EU’s humanitarian aid system was considered to be relatively 
weak and inadequate because of a fragmentation of resources. Although the 
EEC’s humanitarian aid budget had significantly grown since the 1970s, the 
responsibilities remained scattered among different Directorate-Generals within 
the Commission. Depending on the nature of the crisis and the destination, 
humanitarian aid would be managed by DG I (external relations), DG VIII 
(development) or DG VI (agriculture). Creating a single service would enhance 
the efficiency of EU aid. 
Second, the creation of a single focal point for humanitarian assistance would 
also increase the visibility of the EU on the international scene. Before 1992, 
the public was practically unaware of the EU’s actions regarding humanitarian 
aid.33 In its decision establishing ECHO, the Commission explicitly refers to 
the lack of visibility among the general public within and outside of Europe as 
one of the shortcomings that the creation of ECHO should address. Or, as the 
later Commissioner Bonino put it: “I would like the little known Samaritan 
which is the EU, to have the public profile it deserves”.34 The quest for visibility 
in humanitarian aid policy and development policy more broadly has also been 
noted by other scholars35, and it remains relevant to date, for instance, with the 
establishment of a Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (cf. supra).36 
Third, the post-Cold War context provided an opportunity for the EU to profile 
itself more clearly on the international front; this also became clear in the 
Maastricht Treaty, which transformed the former European Political Cooperation 
system into a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The end of the Cold War also 
removed some previous constraints against humanitarian aid, such as the almost 
31 See supra note 23. 
32 See also H. Versluys, ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?’, in: J. Orbie 
(ed.), Europe’s Global Role. External Policies of the European Union (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2008); 
C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge, 2006), 
131; M. Holland and M. Doidge, The European Union and the Third World (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2012), 109-110; T. Mowjee, ‘The European Community Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO): 1992-1999 and Beyond’, 22 Disasters 3 (1998), 250-267. Scappucci, op. cit., 33-35.
33 Scappucci, op. cit., 29.
34 Ibid., 74.
35 G.R. Olsen, ‘Changing European Concerns: Security and Complex Political Emergencies 
instead of Development’, in: K. Arts and A.K Dickson, EU Development Cooperation: From 
Model to Symbol (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 87; F. Petiteville, Les ONG 
et l’action humanitaire dans la mise en scène internationale de l’Union européenne (Paper presented 
at Colloque ONG et action humanitaire: entre militantisme transnational et action publique. 
Faculte de droit et de science politique, 12-13 April 2001).
36 For more on the Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, see Section 3 of this report.
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inherently political nature of assistance, the difficulties in reaching victims in 
the other “bloc”, and the prioritisation of military resources.37 The same period 
also witnessed a number of severe humanitarian challenges, e.g. in Iraq after 
the first Gulf War and in former Yugoslavia. Against this backdrop, the number 
of humanitarian interventions increased, and the notion of “responsibility to 
protect” was developed. 
Fourth, providing humanitarian aid not only had the advantage of being 
a visible form of external action, it could also divert attention from internal 
disagreements on foreign and security policy issues. As such, EU humanitarian 
aid could also be seen as a foreign policy “by default”. When the EU is faced with 
an international crisis and fails to achieve a common position, it can more easily 
fall back on its significant budget for humanitarian assistance. More cynically, it 
could also be seen as an “alibi”, giving the EU a “good conscience” in the absence 
of a real Common Foreign and Security Policy.38 
Fifth, and finally, the existence of an insulated administrative structure such as 
ECHO makes it easier to resist political interference, and thus, to engage with 
the humanitarian principles. As principal-agent models have shown at length, 
the principals (e.g. the EU Member States) delegate specific tasks to the agencies 
(e.g. at the EU level) in order to realise policy goals (e.g. humanitarian principles) 
that would be more difficult to achieve within a more politicised context (e.g. 
Member State foreign policy or DG External Relations). Being insulated from 
day-to-day electoral pressures makes it easier to take a needs-based approach, 
to focus on the “forgotten crises” in the world, and to make an objective choice 
of its NGO partners.39 At the same time, the emphasis on ECHO’s neutrality 
may also stem from the Member States’ desire to limit the Commission’s role in 
foreign affairs.40 
2.2  The 1990s: teething problems and a new legal 
framework
Despite the growing recognition of humanitarian aid as a specific and important 
external policy within the Commission’s institutional structure, European 
integration in this area was still limited during the beginning of the 1990s. 
ECHO constituted a separate “office” within the Commission, which may be 
more sustainable than a “task force”, but it was not (yet) a full-fledged DG.41 
The office was initially established for a “trial period” of seven years. More 
importantly, a clear legal basis for EU humanitarian aid was lacking. Although 
37 Scappucci, op. cit., 14-15.
38 Ibid.
39 Versluys, European Humanitarian Aid Policy, op. cit., 24-25.
40 E. Brusset and C. Tiberghien, Trends and Risks in EU Humanitarian Action. The New 
Humanitarianism: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action (Overseas Development 
Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group, HPG Report 11, 2002), 57.
41 Scappucci, op. cit., 34.
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ECHO was established during the same period as the intergovernmental 
conference leading to the Treaty of Maastricht42, the latter did not include a 
single reference to humanitarian aid. 
It took until 1996 for a legal framework to be provided, and it emerged only 
through secondary law, namely Council Regulation 1257/96 on humanitarian 
aid.43 This Regulation was adopted on the legal basis of former Article 130w of 
the EC Treaty (later Art. 179 EC; now Art. 209 TFEU) relating to development 
cooperation. This choice of legal basis, which may be explained by the historical 
links with humanitarian assistance to the ACP countries and the absence of a 
more specific Treaty basis at the time, is somewhat controversial.44 First, the scope 
of application of Regulation 1257/96 is not restricted to developing countries, 
and following the logic of the Community Guarantee to EIB case, it may well be 
argued that such a legal act cannot be adopted on the ground of development 
competences alone.45 Second, the adoption of a humanitarian aid instrument in 
the framework of development cooperation risks undermining the specificity 
of humanitarian assistance, as it could blur the lines between humanitarian aid 
and development cooperation. Nevertheless, the preamble and Article 1 of the 
Regulation point at the needs-based and impartial nature of the humanitarian 
assistance. 
Apart from this Regulation, a number of initiatives were taken, which 
gradually increased the EU’s capacity as a humanitarian aid donor. In 1993, 
the first Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) with specialised humanitarian 
organisations was signed. The partnership formula aims to emphasise that the 
EU is not just a “cash dispenser”, but that it is on an equal footing with the 
actors engaged in relief operations. To date, the relationship between DG 
ECHO and the international organisations, UN agencies, Member State 
agencies and NGOs continues to be settled by FPAs. Once they sign a FPA46, 
partners can submit project proposals to ECHO. In 1996, the Humanitarian 
Aid Committee (HAC) was set up to enable EU Member States to provide input 
in ECHO’s decision making. In the same year, the Commission issued its first 
Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) 
42 Emergency humanitarian aid from the Community: Commission guidelines (Memo P 91/56, 
24/07/1991) European Commission Decision to set up a European Office for Humanitarian 
Aid, P/91/69, 06/11/1991.
43 Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, [1996] OJ L163/1. 
44 M. Broberg, ‘Undue Assistance? An Analysis of the Legal Basis of Regulation 1257/96 
concerning Humanitarian Aid’, 34 ELRev. 5 (2009), 769-778.
45 In this case, the ECJ found that a decision granting a Community guarantee to the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) against losses under loans and loan guarantees for projects outside of the 
Community had to be adopted under the dual legal basis of former Article 179 EC (now Art. 
209 TFEU) and former Article 181a EC (now Art. 212 TFEU) reflecting the adoption of such 
measures with respect to developing countries, on the one hand, and non-developing countries, 
on the other hand. See: ECJ, Case C-155/07, European Parliament v. Council ECR [2008] I 
8103, para. 67-72. 
46 For UN agencies, these are “Financial and Administrative Framework Agreements” (FAFA).
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in order to address the “grey zone” between short-term humanitarian assistance 
and long-term development aid.47 Despite these improvements in terms of legal 
framework and political implementation, the 1990s were characterised by a series 
of financial and managerial problems, as well as a politicisation of humanitarian 
aid decisions. ECHO’s increasing financial responsibilities, combined with the 
understaffing of the agency, contributed to several shortcomings. These ranged 
from long delays and cumbersome procedures to a lack of control of partner 
organisations and even financial scandals. The partnership formula turned 
out to be inefficient and overly complicated. Attempts by the Commission to 
provide a legal basis for humanitarian aid in the Amsterdam Treaty, possibly in 
the section on development policy, were unsuccessful.48 In 1997, the Court of 
Auditors issued a report critical of ECHO.49 In 1999, following the seven-year 
trial period, the internal evaluation of ECHO also contained strong criticism. 
Fraudulent contracts in the context of Bosnia and the African Great Lakes region 
were part of the scandals that led to the demise of the Santer Commission in 
1999. In the context of widespread suspicion among the Member States and 
even within the Commission, ECHO’s budgetary resources declined in the 
second half of the 1990s.50 
Apart from management-related challenges, ECHO’s compliance with the 
humanitarian principles was also questioned. Under Commissioner Bonino 
(1995-1999), ECHO became a visible part of the EU’s international policies, 
but according to Versluys, it “sometimes engaged in activities which, strictly 
speaking, went beyond humanitarian assistance and were more oriented towards 
conflict resolution or development”.51 For instance, Bonino was strongly involved 
in human rights activism in Afghanistan, against the Taliban’s oppression 
of women.52 In 1999, ECHO’s budget showed a dramatic increase, but only 
because of the EU’s involvement in the Kosovo crisis, which was mostly inspired 
by political and security concerns.53 
2.3  The 2000s: Political reforms and the constitutionalisation 
of humanitarian aid as a specific EU external policy
The new Commissioner Nielson (1999-2004) initiated not only a new style, but 
also a range of institutional reforms. Under his tenure, ECHO “lost some of its 
idealism and romance, but gained in efficiency and speed” and became “more 
middle aged and mature, less high spirited perhaps, but a leaner, meaner, more 
47 On the concept of LRRD, see further at section 5.2 of this report.
48 Scappucci, op. cit., 41-43.
49 Court of Auditors Special Report No 2/97 Concerning humanitarian aid from the European 
Union between 1992 and 1995 together with the Commission’s replies, OJ (1997) C 143/1-65.
50 Versluys, European Humanitarian Aid Policy, op. cit., 5.
51 Versluys, ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?’, op. cit., 93.
52 Versluys, European Humanitarian Aid Policy, op. cit., 5.
53 Versluys, ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?’, op. cit., 102.
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professional aid machine”.54 The distinction between relief, on the one hand, and 
crisis management and development, on the other hand, was more consistently 
made. Internal reforms led to a more professional management. For example, 
the fast-track procedure for decision-making in Brussels was introduced in 2001, 
and clear performance indicators for partners on the ground were elaborated. 
Under Nielson, the Commission also clarified its core mandate and policies, 
strongly emphasising its needs-based, neutral and non-discriminatory approach. 
ECHO adopted a proactive strategy to defend the principles of international 
humanitarian law, supporting the adoption of the Principles and Good Practices 
of Humanitarian Donorship in Stockholm (2003), confirming that humanitarian 
funding should be allocated on the basis of needs assessment. Also, Member 
State donors started to recognise the positive steps taken by the Commission.55 
These reforms coincided with a general professionalisation of the EU’s 
development policy architecture, including the creation of EuropeAid for the 
implementation of development assistance.56 Despite this progress, there were 
still several challenges ahead. The Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-
2003) addressed two thorny (and interrelated) issues that continued to plague 
the EU’s image regarding humanitarian aid: the absence of a clear treaty base 
and the blurred relationship with foreign and security policy concerns. The 
ground-breaking work of the European Convention may be surprising, because 
initially, the members did not even consider the incorporation of a special title 
on humanitarian aid.57 A number of Member States even wanted to reinforce 
the operational links between humanitarian aid and CFSP because of their 
disappointment with the slow progress in military cooperation.58 It was only after 
Commissioner Nielson’s appeal to the Convention that “humanitarian assistance 
should be covered by a distinct chapter of external policy, subject to specific 
Community decision-making mechanisms and not fall under crisis management 
procedures”59 that a separate article on humanitarian aid was proposed.60 This 
upgraded status of humanitarian aid into primary EU law was barely contested 
54 International Crisis Group, quoted in Versluys, ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or 
Political Tool?’, op. cit., 93.
55 European Commission, Report on progress against commitments (Cabinet of Commissioner 
Nielson, July 2004), 27-29.
56 J. Orbie, ‘The EU as an Actor in Development: Just Another Donor, European Norm Maker, 
or Eclipsed by Superpower Temptations?’, in: S. Grimm, D. Makhan and S. Gänzle (eds), 
The European Union and Global Development: an Enlightened Superpower in the Making? 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 20.
57 CONV 161/02, 3 July 2002; CONV 200/02, 16 July 2002; CONV 252/02, 10 September 2002.
58 P. Nielson, ‘EU Aid: What Works and Why’, ReCom/UNU-WIDER Working Paper No. 
2012/76, p.15.
59 CONV WG VII – WD 48, 21 November 2002.
60 WG VII – WD 21 REV 1, 22 November 2002; WG VII – WD 21 REV 2, 29 November 2002; 
CONV 685/03, 23 April 2012.
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in the Convention discussions.61 A political consensus about the need for a more 
professional and independent humanitarian aid policy at EU level had clearly 
emerged. The idea to establish a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps 
was also featured in the new Treaty article, although this was more contested 
within the Convention.62
The non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty did not mean the end for the 
recognition of the specificity of humanitarian aid within the EU’s external action. 
The Lisbon Treaty, which was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into force 
on 1 December 2009, literally recycled the Constitutional Treaty’s humanitarian 
aid provisions.63 Moreover, in December 2007, the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council jointly adopted the “European Consensus 
on Humanitarian Aid”.64 A similar consensus on development had been adopted 
in December 2005,65 revealing the distinction between the two policy areas. 
The European Consensus on humanitarian aid strongly reaffirms the EU’s 
adherence to the fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality, humanity, 
impartiality and independence.66 To date, it remains the major reference to the 
EU’s commitment in relation to humanitarian aid. Interestingly, the European 
Consensus outlines the “common vision that guides the action of the EU, both at 
its Member States and Community levels”. As such, it also refers to the ambition 
of DG ECHO not only to establish itself as an independent humanitarian 
donor, but also to “Europeanise” the Member States’ activities in this area.
With the European Consensus and Art. 214 TEU, the EU has put in place “a 
solid humanitarian policy that is in line with the GHD (Good Humanitarian 
Donorship) principles, is anchored in relevant legislation and is applicable 
across the Commission and Member States”.67 Several explanations behind this 
evolution have already been mentioned: increasing efficiency and economies 
of scale, insulating the humanitarian principles from political pressures, and 
enhancing the legitimacy and visibility of the EU as an international actor. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the expansion of a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy at the EU level also may have contributed to the growing independence 
61 The only two elements that provoked some debate in the Convention were the questions of 
whether “neutrality” should be added to the principles in paragraph 2 and whether a reference 
to the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps in the Treaty would be desirable (see infra 
part III). For a summary of the amendments, see: CONV 685/03, 23 April 2012.
62 For more on the Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, see Section 3 of this report.
63 See Section 3 of this report for a detailed analysis of Article 214 TFEU. 
64 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. OJ C 25, 30.1.2008.
65 OJ C 42, 24.2.2006. 
66 In 2008, an Action Plan was approved (SEC/2008/1991 29.5.2008). There was also a mid-term 
review in 2010 and annual progress reports. 
67 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), European Union: Peer Review 2012 (Paris: OECD), 24.
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of the EU humanitarian aid sphere. Since the EU now has several foreign policy 
related instruments in its toolbox, there is no need to rely on humanitarian 
resources for these purposes.68 
However, privileged observers such as former Commissioner Nielson69 and the 
VOICE network of humanitarian aid NGOs70 warn that the humanitarian 
principles are often poorly understood and constantly under pressure from the 
actors involved in development, as well as foreign and security policies. NGOs 
tend to see the 2007 Humanitarian Consensus as the high point of the EU’s 
commitment to apolitical and needs-based humanitarian aid. However, this 
document dates back almost a decade, and the Action Plan was not extended 
after 2013. The question can be raised of whether the quest for more coherence 
may have the (intentional or unintentional) effect of eroding the commitments 
made in the Humanitarian Consensus. Following a legal analysis of the specific 
characteristics of humanitarian aid under Article 214 TFEU (Section 3), the rest 
of the report will take a closer look at the possible implications of the Lisbon 
Treaty for guaranteeing the specific position of humanitarian aid within the 
broader context of the EU’s external action.
68 Versluys European Humanitarian Aid Policy op. cit.
69 P. Nielson, op. cit. 
70 Interview with Kathrin Schick, Director of VOICE, 4 February 2013.
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3 The specific features of 
EU humanitarian aid: 
implications of Article 
214 TFEU
Arguably, the introduction of Article 214 TFEU reinforces the specific nature 
of humanitarian aid as a separate EU external policy. It not only codifies the 
EU’s competence to act in this field (3.1.), but also underlines the importance 
of respect for key principles derived from international humanitarian law as a 
crucial precondition for the implementation of the EU’s humanitarian activities 
(3.2.). Nevertheless, the new Treaty provision also creates new challenges as far 
as respect for those principles is concerned (3.3.)
3.1  The legal nature of the EU’s competence in the field of 
humanitarian aid
Pursuant to Article 4 (4) TFEU, the EU is competent “to carry out activities 
and conduct a common policy” in the areas of development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid. Significantly, “the exercise of that competence shall not result 
in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs”. Accordingly, the 
Treaty of Lisbon codified the shared and parallel nature of the EU’s humanitarian 
aid competence.71 Just as in the area of development cooperation, EU initiatives 
to develop a common humanitarian aid policy do not have a pre-emptive 
effect on the Member States. Both the EU and its Member States can conclude 
international agreements with third countries and international organisations on 
matters related to humanitarian assistance.72
Even though the EU and the Member States can act in parallel, they are 
nonetheless under an obligation to take each other’s activities into account. This 
follows from the duties of consistency and loyal cooperation, which have been 
given an even more prominent place with the Treaty of Lisbon.73 Moreover, 
Article 214, paragraph 1 TFEU explicitly provides that “the Union’s measures 
and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other”, 
whereas paragraph 6 endows the European Commission with the competence 
71 In the Bangladesh case of 1993, the European Court of Justice had already observed that “the 
Community does not have exclusive competence in the field of humanitarian aid, and that 
consequently the Member States are not precluded from exercising their competence in that 
regard collectively in the Council or outside it”. See: Joint cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, 
European Parliament v. Council [ECR] 1993, I-3685, para. 16.
72 Art. 214 (4) TFEU.
73 See articles 4(3) TEU, 13(1) TEU and 7 TFEU. 
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to “take any useful initiative to promote coordination between actions of the 
Union and those of the Member States, in order to enhance the efficiency and 
complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures”. 
The existence of parallel EU and Member State competences regarding 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid can be linked to the particular 
characteristics of both policies. Taking into account their important budgetary 
implications, visibility and close connections to foreign policy objectives 
and preferences, the Member States appear reluctant to accept a far-reaching 
competence transfer to the EU level.74 Moreover, parallel action by the Union and 
the Member States, either individually or collectively, can contribute to a better 
burden-sharing of the technical and financial efforts related to development and 
humanitarian aid. This may result in more intensive assistance than would be 
the case if Union action excluded further Member State activities in support 
of developing countries and/or in the wake of an emergency. Or, to paraphrase 
Advocate General Kokott: the more development and humanitarian assistance, 
the better.75 
Despite the similarities between the EU’s development and humanitarian aid 
competences, subtle differences exist. Whereas Article 209 (1) TFEU allows 
for the adoption of “measures necessary for the implementation of development 
cooperation”, Article 214 (3) TFEU only refers to “measures defining the 
framework within which the Union’s humanitarian aid operations shall be 
implemented”.76 This may be linked to the specific features of EU humanitarian 
assistance, which is essentially implemented by NGOs and specialist international 
organisations or bodies through Framework Partnership Agreements (FPAs, see 
above).77 A key objective of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy is to operate as 
a facilitator for providing first aid and relief in emergency situations. In this 
context, Article 214 (6) TFEU gives a mandate to the European Commission 
to “take any useful initiative to promote coordination between actions of the 
Union and those of the Member States, in order to enhance the efficiency and 
complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures”. Arguably, 
this general focus on coordination reveals that the division between “shared” and 
“coordinating” competences in Articles 4 and 6 TFEU is not straightforward.78 
74 On the Member States’ sovereignty concerns with respect to the EU’s humanitarian aid policy, 
see also: F. Pusterla and E. Pusterla, ‘The Uniqueness of the EU Humanitarian Aid Policy 
between Sovereignty and Humanitarian Concerns’, EFA Rev. (2015), 247-266.
75 See: Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-13/07, Commission v. Council, para. 70. 
The Opinion of the Advocate General only concerned the parallel nature of the Community’s 
development cooperation competences at the time, but the same reasoning applies mutatis 
mutandis with regard to humanitarian aid.
76 Emphasis added. 
77 Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation 1257/96. Article 9 of the same Regulation provides that “where 
necessary, the Community may also finance humanitarian operations by the Commission or the 
Member States’ specialised agencies”. 
78 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 395.
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As far as humanitarian aid (and development cooperation) is concerned, the EU 
is both a significant actor/donor and a coordinator of Member State actions.  
The Commission’s competence to promote coordination between humanitarian 
actions of the Union and the Member States is nothing new, because it is 
already included with so many words in Article 10 (1) of Regulation 1257/96 
and also appears prominently in the European Consensus document (see above 
2.3).79 Article 10 (2) of Regulation 1257/96 deals with the Commission’s 
coordinating role in relation to international organisations and agencies, in 
particular those which form part of the United Nations system, and Article 10 
(3) provides that the Commission “shall endeavour to develop collaboration and 
cooperation between the Community and third-country donors in the field of 
humanitarian aid”. It is noteworthy that Article 214 (7) TFEU endows the task 
of coordination with international organisations and bodies to the Union, rather 
than specifically to the Commission, whereas Article 214 TFEU remains silent 
on the task of coordination with other third country donors. This is a direct 
consequence of the Lisbon Treaty innovations, which granted the responsibility 
for cooperation with international organisations to the High Representative 
and the Commission80 and resulted in the establishment of Union – rather than 
Commission – Delegations. In practice, the Commission actively pursues a 
coordinating role both in relationship to the activities of the Member States and 
other international actors, whether they are international organisations, agencies 
or third country donors. The initiative of Commissioner Georgieva to convene 
a major donor conference in response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in 
Syria provides a good illustration of the Commission’s coordinating activities in 
the field of humanitarian aid.81 
3.2  A policy based on principles of international humanitarian 
law
The EU’s external action is based upon the strict observance and development 
of international law.82 As a result, the EU’s humanitarian aid policy is embedded 
within the broader framework of international humanitarian law (IHL).83 The 
latter is essentially based upon the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two 
79 In 1996, ECHO was already better equipped than many EU Member States and their staff 
in terms of expertise, most notably through its extensive network of field experts (Versluys, 
European Humanitarian Aid Policy, op. cit., 21). However, this coordination commitment was 
barely implemented. The European Consensus has brought this ambition back to the fore, 
leading to a further Europeanisation of humanitarian aid. 
80 Article 220 (2) TFEU.
81 ‘Humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis: EU Commissioner convenes donors, Syria’s 
neighbours and aid agencies’, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1032_en.htm.  
82 Art. 3 (5) TEU and Art. 21 (1) TEU. 
83 See: Art. 214 (2) TFEU and the updated EU guidelines on promoting compliance with 
international humanitarian law, OJ (2009) C 303/12. 
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Protocols of 1977.84 In addition, other international conventions and customary 
international law determine the content and scope of IHL.85 
The principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are generally recognised 
as the common denominator in international legal instruments related to 
humanitarian aid in disaster situations.86 The notion of independence, which is 
also often mentioned, may be considered as a “derived principle” in so far as its 
substance, i.e. the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, military 
or economic influences, follows from the other principles.87 The same reasoning 
applies with regard to the principle of non-discrimination. Nevertheless, like 
independence, non-discrimination is sometimes explicitly included as a separate 
concept alongside the notions of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. This 
is, for instance, the case in Article 9 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions relating to the protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts,88 in the International Code of Conduct for the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement,89 and in Article 6 of the draft Convention on Protection 
of Persons in the Event of Disasters, which is currently being prepared by the 
International Law Commission.90 
The EU’s 2007 European Consensus refers to “humanity, neutrality, impartiality 
and independence” as four “fundamental humanitarian principles”. The 
document also provides a definition of those terms. Humanity implies that 
“human suffering must be addressed, wherever it is found, with particular 
attention to the most vulnerable in the population”, neutrality means that 
humanitarian aid “must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute”, 
impartiality requires that “humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis 
of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations” and 
respect for independence entails “the autonomy of humanitarian objectives 
from political, economic, military or other objectives”. Hence, the sole 
purpose of humanitarian aid is “to relieve and prevent the suffering of victims 
84 For the text of the Conventions and the Protocols, see: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
vwTreaties1949.xsp. 
85 An overview of the principle legal instruments of IHL are included in an annex to the updated 
EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law, OJ (2009) C 
303/12. 
86 Memorandum by the Secretariat of the International Law Commission, ‘Protection of Persons 
in the Event of Disasters’, A/CN.4/590, para. 11. See also: G. Venturi, ‘International Disaster 
Response Law in Relation to Other Branches of International Law’, in: A. De Guttry, M. Gestri 
and G. Venturi, (eds.), International Disaster Response Law (New York: Springer, 2012), 52.
87 Casolari, op. cit., 134. 
88 Text available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/. 
89 Text available at: http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I259EN.pdf. 
90 Draft Article 6 of this Convention provides: “Response of disasters shall take place in 
accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, and on the basis of 
non-discrimination, while taking into account the needs of the particularly vulnerable”. See: 
International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L776. 
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of humanitarian crises”.91 The four humanitarian principles, as defined in the 
European Consensus, correspond with the practice of the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)92 and are based on a 
number of UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions.93
It is noteworthy that Article 214 (2) TFEU refers to “impartiality, neutrality and 
non-discrimination” as fundamental principles guiding the EU’s humanitarian 
aid. In other words, there is a striking difference between the humanitarian 
principles included in the European Consensus and those in the Treaty. This 
unavoidably leads to the question of whether this distinction is intentional 
and what implications it may have. Arguably, this discrepancy, which seems 
remarkable at first sight, can only be understood in light of the history behind 
the Lisbon Treaty.94 The 2004 draft Constitutional Treaty included a provision 
that was identical to what became Article 214 TFEU. During the negotiations 
on the Lisbon Treaty, the easiest option was therefore to simply copy/paste the 
old provision without further discussion. Whereas the addition of “humanity” 
would not have sparked much debate, the notion of “independence” was more 
controversial, because it potentially contrasts with the ambition to develop a 
more “comprehensive approach” in response to crisis situations. Hence, a 
suggestion by the European Commission to include all four of the humanitarian 
principles in the European Consensus in the new Lisbon Treaty provision “was 
declined out of fear that it would open a Pandora’s Box”.95
Despite the absence of an explicit reference to humanity and independence in 
Article 214 (2) TFEU, it is difficult to maintain that those principles would not 
bind the institutions and the Member States in pursuing the EU’s humanitarian 
aid policy.96 After all, Article 214 (2) also contains a reference to “the principles 
of international law”, and pursuant to Article 21 TEU, the Union’s external 
action shall by guided by, amongst other things, “respect for human dignity, the 
91 Ibid., para. 14. 
92 See: http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_HumPrinciple_English.pdf. 
93 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991 on ‘Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations’ laid down that 
“humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality”, A/RES/46/182. General Assembly Resolution 58/114 of 17 
December 2003 reaffirmed those principles and recognised that “independence, meaning the 
autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military and other objectives 
that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented, 
is also an important guiding principle for the provision of humanitarian assistance”, A/
RES/58/114. Security Council Resolution S/RES/1674 of 28 April 2006 on the protection 
of civilians in armed conflicts also “stresses the importance for all, within the framework of 
humanitarian assistance, of upholding and respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence”. 
94 See: M. Broberg, ‘EU Humanitarian Aid after the Lisbon Treaty’, 22 (3) Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management (2013), 168. 
95 Ibid., 169.
96 See also: F. Casolari, ‘The External Dimension of the EU Disaster Response’, in: A. De Guttry, 
M. Gestri and G. Venturi, (eds.), op. cit.,152. 
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principles of equality and solidarity and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law”. Respect for the key rules of international 
humanitarian law – including the principles of humanity and independence – 
falls within the scope of those provisions.97 Moreover, Article 1 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights unequivocally states that “[h]uman dignity is inviolable. 
It must be respected and promoted”. This reflection of the humanity principle 
binds the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the 
Member States when they are acting under Article 214 TFEU. 
3.3  The paradox of Article 214 TFEU: humanitarian principles 
under pressure? 
Despite the clear link between EU humanitarian aid and IHL, concerns have 
been raised that the humanitarian principles may be under pressure. In particular, 
NGOs did not appear to be entirely satisfied with the drafting of Article 214 
TFEU.98 Two issues are of particular concern. First, Article 214 (5) TFEU 
explicitly provides for the establishment of a European Voluntary Humanitarian 
Aid Corps (EVHC). There is a fear that the political inspiration of this initiative 
may contrast with the humanitarian principles (3.3.1.). Second, there is also a 
more general concern that the integration of humanitarian assistance within the 
framework of the EU’s external action may negatively affect the independence of 
the EU’s humanitarian action (3.3.2.)
3.3.1  The EU Aid Volunteers Initiative: humanitarian and 
citizenship objectives
Former Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs George Papandreou launched 
the idea of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (EVHC) at the 
European Convention that was to draft the EU’s Constitutional Treaty. His 
source of inspiration was the American “Peace Corps”, established in the 1960s 
by President Kennedy as an initiative for American students to be involved in 
development activities all over the world.99 The proposal was introduced at a 
later stage in the discussions within the Convention and became part of the 
Constitutional Treaty’s provision on humanitarian aid. It received some criticism 
from different corners. First, the NGO community feared that a voluntary 
aid corps may undermine the increasing professionalism in the humanitarian 
aid sector, potentially leading to dangerous situations in conflict areas.100The 
European Commission also found it inadvisable to send European volunteers to 
high-risk crisis situations and suggested the inclusion of the idea of a voluntary 
97 Significantly, the EU’s Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy specifies that the 
Union will, amongst other things, promote the observance of international humanitarian law in 
the context of its external action. Council of the EU, doc. 11855/12, 25 June 2012. 
98 http://www.ngovoice.org/documents/HA-Dev_NGO_response18Jun03.pdf. 
99 Broberg, ‘EU Humanitarian Aid after the Lisbon Treaty’, op. cit.
100 VOICE Press Release: ‘EU Constitution endangers humanitarian aid’, 27 October 2003 
(available at: http://www.ngovoice.org/documents/VOICEPressReleaseIGC_27-10-03.pdf ). 
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corps in the Treaty provision on development cooperation or citizenship.101 
Second, several members of the Convention, as well as academic commentators, 
questioned the need for a specific Treaty provision on voluntary work. According 
to Bruno De Witte, the inclusion of a reference to the EVHC in the Treaty 
illustrates “the relentless accumulation of constitutional law” in the field of EU 
external relations: “In most states, such an initiative would be announced in a 
press statement of the government and not in the Constitution!”102 Third, several 
members of the Convention questioned whether the EU is the appropriate 
level to organise such a volunteer initiative. There were some concerns that 
this initiative may be primarily aimed at being a promotional tool to increase 
the visibility of the EU’s humanitarian actions.103 As stated above (see 2.1), the 
emphasis on visibility has been a constant (albeit much contested) consideration 
since the establishment of an EU humanitarian aid policy. Arguably, such 
visibility requirements may conflict with the humanitarian imperative to provide 
aid on a needs-based approach. Moreover, it may affect the independence from 
political, economic, military or other objectives. 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned critical voices, the idea of an EVHC 
remained part of the Treaty provision on humanitarian aid. Arguably, the 
widespread popular support for the initiative104, as well as the ambition to use 
the new corps as an instrument of community building105 explained its inclusion 
in Article 214 TFEU. Nevertheless, the implementation of this newly acquired 
competence faced numerous challenges. There was little support for the idea 
within the family of humanitarian aid workers. Moreover, there was neither an 
exact definition of a “volunteer” nor a clear description of the possible tasks 
or required training. In the given context, the Commission launched a broad 
consultation with stakeholders in 2010106 before drafting a legislative proposal 
in 2012.107 
101 Broberg, ‘EU Humanitarian Aid after the Lisbon Treaty’, op. cit.
102 B. De Witte, ‘Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union’s Foreign Relations?’, in: 
M. Cremona and B. De Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law. Constitutional Fundamentals 
(Oxford: Hart, 2008), 13. 
103 VOICE Press Release, op. cit.
104 According to a 2010 Eurobarometer report, up to 88% of the European population supports the 
proposal of an EVHC. 
105 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Commission’s proposal on establishing an EVHC 
underlined that raising “the levels of awareness about the Union’s humanitarian aid and its 
visibility” is an underlying objective of this initiative. See: Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing the European Voluntary Humanitarian 
Aid Corps, COM (2012) 514, Brussels, 19.9.2012, p. 2. 
106 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
‘How to express EU citizen’s solidarity through volunteering: first reflections on a European 
Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps’, COM (2010) 683 final. 
107 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of European Parliament and of the Council, 
‘Establishing the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps – EU Aid Volunteers’, COM 
(2012) 514 final. 
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The Commission proposal and Regulation No 375/2014 of 3 April 2014108 reflect 
the multiple objectives behind the EVHC, which was rebranded as the “EU Aid 
Volunteers Initiative”. On the one hand, the initiative “should contribute to 
efforts to strengthen the Union’s capacity to provide needs-based humanitarian 
assistance”. On the other hand, it should also “help Europeans of all ages to 
demonstrate active European citizenship. The initiative should thus contribute 
to promoting volunteering across the Union and to the personal development 
and intercultural awareness of participating volunteers”.109 In other words, the 
aims of the humanitarian aid corps go beyond mere humanitarian assistance 
to also include an explicit citizenship dimension. This is expressly confirmed in 
Article 4 of Regulation 375/2014. 
In order to reassure the humanitarian aid community, Regulation 375/2014 also 
includes numerous references to the European Consensus and the principles of 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Moreover, the selection 
process occurs in close cooperation with the NGO sector and includes training 
sessions for applicants. From 2011 onwards, the European Commission has 
launched a number of pilot projects led by a consortium of humanitarian 
organisations in anticipation of the real start of the programme in 2015. By 2020, 
more than 18,000 citizens are expected to be deployed as EU Aid Volunteers 
in humanitarian projects worldwide.110 Whereas the initial scepticism among 
humanitarian aid workers seemed to fade away after the adoption of a legal and 
financial framework,111 some objections remain in place. As indicated by former 
Commissioner Georgieva, the success of the programme largely depends upon 
“expectations management”. There are a large number of candidates, but the 
selection of volunteers should be based on a thorough assessment of what is 
needed in terms of skills and profiles in the field.112 
3.3.2 Humanitarian aid as part of the EU’s external action
According to Article 214 (1) TFEU, EU humanitarian aid shall not only be 
implemented in compliance with the general principles of international 
(humanitarian) law, it shall also be conducted “within the framework of the 
principles and objectives of the external action of the Union”. This reference is 
included as a standard clause in all Treaty provisions dealing with EU external 
108 Regulation (EU) No 375/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
establishing the European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (‘EU Aid Volunteers Initiative’), 
OJ (2014) L 122/1.
109 See considerations (6) and (15) of the preamble to Regulation 375/2014. 
110 See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/what/humanitarian-aid/eu-aid-volunteers. 
111 A budget of € 147.9 million is foreseen for the period 2014-2020. 
112 K. Georgieva, ‘The lessons learned and ways forward for EU Aid Volunteers’, EU Aid Volunteers 
Conference, Brussels, 16 September 2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-13-712_en.htm 
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policies113 and reflects a general preoccupation of the Lisbon Treaty with ensuring 
the coherence of the Union’s action on the international scene.114 The key 
reference point listing the EU’s general principles and objectives is Article 21 
TEU. 
A strict reading of Article 214 (1) TFEU may suggest that humanitarian aid 
can be used as an instrument to achieve the entire list of objectives mentioned 
in Article 21 TEU, including, for instance, the ambition to preserve peace, 
prevent conflicts and strengthen international security.115 Obviously, such an 
interpretation potentially affects the independence of humanitarian operations 
and risks a movement towards the instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid. 
It would confirm the longstanding fears of NGOs and critical observers that 
political and other considerations could overshadow the humanitarian principles 
and that humanitarian aid could be used instrumentally for the purpose of other 
foreign policy goals. Theoretically, this would correspond to what scholars have 
called “malign coherence”,116 namely coherence stemming from the dominance 
of a particular policy objective within a particular institutional setting over a 
weaker institutional setting with different objectives. In contrast to “positive” 
or “synergetic” coherence, which is the outcome of two (or more) policy fields 
joining hands in pursuit of a common goal, malign coherence denotes that 
coherence is not always a win-win situation, but that it can be the result of a 
political conflict between competing objectives and bureaucratic institutions.117 
However, the inclusion of a horizontal list of external action objectives in 
Article 21 TEU does not absolve the institutions from respecting the principle 
of conferral as expressed in the specific legal bases mentioned in the Treaties.118 
Pursuant to Article 214 (2) TFEU, the Union is only competent to pursue a 
humanitarian aid policy with respect to international (humanitarian) law and 
the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination (cf. supra). 
The latter precludes humanitarian operations from being used to pursue the 
political, military or economic objectives of the EU’s external action listed in 
Article 21 TEU. The first sentence of Article 214 (1) TFEU cannot affect this 
legal obligation. Moreover, Article 40 TEU forms an additional guarantee of the 
independence of EU humanitarian aid in relation to potential foreign policy and 
113 Art. 207 TFEU (Common Commercial Policy); Art. 208 TFEU (development cooperation); 
Art. 212 TFEU (economic, technical and financial cooperation with third countries); Article 24 
TEU (Common Foreign and Security Policy).
114 See Art. 23 TEU and 205 TFEU. 
115 Art. 21 (2) (c) TEU. 
116 S. Nuttall, ‘Coherence and Consistency’, in: C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), International Relations 
and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 2005), 76-77; C. Gebhard, ‘Coherence’, in: 
C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), op. cit., 111-112.
117 This point is further illustrated in Section 4 of this report.
118 This can be derived from Art. 3 (6) TEU, which states: “The Union shall pursue its objectives by 
appropriate means commensurate the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties”. 
See also: Dashwood, op. cit., 35. 
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military influences. According to this provision, the implementation of CFSP 
measures cannot affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the 
powers of the institutions under the EU’s non-CFSP action and vice versa.119 
Hence, the incorporation of a specific Treaty provision on humanitarian aid 
helps to consolidate the specific features of EU action in this field without, 
however, solving the often blurred boundaries with other policy areas in practice. 
In the following sections, the report assesses how this dilemma is addressed at 
the institutional level (Section 4) before paying particular attention to the links 
between humanitarian aid and closely related policies, such as crisis management, 
development and trade (Section 5).
119 For comments on Art. 40 TEU, see: P. Van Elsuwege, op. cit., 987-1019.
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4 The institutional 
framework of EU 
humanitarian aid 
This section addresses the issue of coherence from an institutional angle. Following 
an introductory part, which highlights the opportunities and challenges of the 
main institutional innovations relating to EU humanitarian aid, the section 
outlines the institutional and operational framework of the EU’s humanitarian 
aid (4.1). Next, it sheds light on the institutional and operational interaction 
between DG ECHO and the other EU external action players involved in the 
formulation and/or implementation of the EU’s humanitarian aid policy (4.2). 
The next part looks at the institutional interaction between DG ECHO and the 
Member States (4.3). The section then turns to the institutional relation of DG 
ECHO with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)/military aspects 
(4.4). The section ends by focusing on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to 
External Conflicts and Crises and assessing its implications for ECHO as a 
separate institutional actor within the EU’s external policy machinery (4.5).
As highlighted above, the recognition of humanitarian assistance as a distinct 
policy resulted in the creation of ECHO as a separate service and later a 
Directorate General within the Commission.120 The institutional insulation of 
ECHO as an autonomous DG has been an important factor in guaranteeing the 
independence of the humanitarian aid sphere at the EU level. This is strongly 
reflected by the fact that DG ECHO remains separated from the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The appointment of a separate Commissioner 
responsible for humanitarian aid in 2009 is another important institutional 
development (see Annex II). According to the OECD, this has “raised the profile 
of humanitarian aid internally, while protecting the independence of decision 
making, and strengthened the EU voice externally”.121 However, having a 
separate Commissioner for humanitarian aid is, in itself, not a guarantee that the 
humanitarian principles will be respected. Whereas the tenure of Emma Bonino 
as the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid (1995-1999) is associated with a 
dilution of the humanitarian principles for the benefit of the EU’s visibility and 
its foreign policy goals, the tenures of Poul Nielson (1999-2004) and Louis 
Michel (2004-2009), who both combined the Development and Humanitarian 
120 Under the Barroso I Commission, in 2004, ECHO was transformed from a specialised 
directorate into a full-fledged Directorate-General. The FPAs with NGOs and international 
organisations were updated in 2009. ECHO’s openness to regular dialogue has been appreciated 
by the partners in the humanitarian community, although the administrative requirements 
remain burdensome (OECD-DAC Report 2012, 88).
121 OECD/DAC, ‘European Union: Peer Review 2012’ (Paris: OECD), 87.
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Aid portfolios (see Annex II), coincided with a growing professionalism and 
independence of humanitarian aid. Former Commissioner Georgieva built 
up a strong reputation in EU policy circles, and it remains to be seen whether 
her successor, Christos Stylianides, will stand on his authority in defending 
humanitarian aid policy to an equal extent.122 In this respect, it is noteworthy 
that he is responsible for “humanitarian aid and crisis management” (see Annex 
II). Whereas such a combination makes sense from the perspective of the EU’s 
comprehensive response to crisis situations, it potentially raises questions about 
the independence of humanitarian assistance from broader foreign policy 
concerns (see below). 
A similar concern exists with regard to the combination of humanitarian 
assistance and civil protection as part of DG ECHO’s responsibilities. Since 2004, 
the scope of DG ECHO and the portfolio of the Commissioner dealing with 
humanitarian aid have been broadened to include civil protection. Therefore, 
DG ECHO was renamed “Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection”. Previously, the Civil Protection unit was based at DG Environment. 
Within ECHO’s organisational chart, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Operations are combined in the same structure (ECHO.B): The organisational 
divisions are not between humanitarian aid and civil protection, but according 
to regions (B.1 to B.5) (See Table 1). The logic behind such a combination is that 
both policies provide complementary tools to address relief assistance to people 
faced with the immediate consequences of natural or man-made disasters. 
However, as was mentioned above, civil protection has a different legal basis (Art. 
196 TFEU) and bears different characteristics. Therefore, NGOs have expressed 
concerns about bringing civil protection and humanitarian aid together under 
the same umbrella.123 On the other hand, the integration of civil protection 
functions into the activities of DG ECHO could improve the coherence of the 
EU’s strategy for crisis response, and as will be shown above, relations with the 
EEAS do not appear to have undermined the fundamental role of humanitarian 
principles.124 
Another important institutional innovation, which should be seen as a further 
continuation of the Lisbon spirit, can be witnessed at the level of the College 
of Commissioners. The new High Representative, Federica Mogherini, was 
tasked by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, to 
revitalise the so-called Relex group, i.e. the EU Commissioners dealing with 
EU external relations. As a result, they are now working much more closely 
together. Similarly, this raises both opportunities and challenges for the EU’s 
humanitarian aid policy. While this strengthened coordination inside the College 
of Commissioners is beneficial in terms of increased awareness about each other’s 
122 Georgieva was named “European of the year” and “EU Commissioner of the year” in 2010. 
123 K. Schick (2013), Director of VOICE, Interview on 4 February 2013.
124 OECD/DAC, op. cit., 90-95.
36 Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations SIEPS 2016:3
principles, objectives and modalities and the higher likelihood of agreeing 
on a common framework for action, there is again a risk that this enhanced 
coordination will lead to a degree of integration that will negatively affect the 
goal of humanitarian aid to address the needs of crisis-affected populations.125
Finally, as will be shown below, separate funding arrangements should further 
contribute to the independence of EU humanitarian assistance. At the same time, 
the EU’s increasing preoccupation with the vertical and horizontal coherence of 
its external policies has led to a multitude of institutional arrangements and 
initiatives designed to formalise coordination and communication between 
the various external policy actors and institutions, which automatically draw 
humanitarian aid into the wider sphere of the EU’s external action. 
4.1  The organisational framework of EU humanitarian aid 
policy
DG ECHO comprises three organisational parts: Directorate A, which 
covers strategy, policy and international cooperation, Directorate B, which is 
responsible for humanitarian and civil protection operations, and Directorate C, 
which deals with resources, partnerships and operational support.126 Directorate 
A is further divided into five units: A/1 Strategy, Coordination and Inter-
Institutional Relations, A/2 Information and Communication, A/3 Policy and 
Implementation Frameworks, A/4 Specific Thematic Policies and A/5 Civil 
Protection Policy, Prevention, Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction. 
Directorate B is also composed of five units. While B/1 is responsible for 
emergency response, the other four units in the directorate each cover specific 
geographic regions (see Table 1). Directorate C, in turn, consists of four 
administrative units (see Table 1).
DG ECHO operates with a staff base of about 340 at its headquarters in Brussels 
and has around 460 staff based in the field.127 In 2013, ECHO’s global field 
network was composed of 140 international humanitarian experts and 320 
local staff members based in 44 field offices across 39 countries.128 ECHO’s 
field presence is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by Asia, Europe, Latin 
America, and the Middle East and North Africa.129 The network operates based 
on a continuous assessment of the humanitarian needs of the countries and 
regions concerned. This means that the assessments determine the need for, 
as well as the size and budget of, the field offices. Apart from identifying and 
evaluating humanitarian needs, the field offices are tasked with the supervision 
of ongoing ECHO-funded operations, the provision of administrative and 
125 VOICE, Newsletter, issue 21, May 2015, 17-18.
126 See http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/who/about-echo/organisational-chart.
127 See http://ec.europa.eu/echo/node/2525.
128 See: ECHO field network, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/jobs/experts/ECHO_Field_
Network.pdf.
129 See http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/interactive-map.
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Table 1:  DG ECHO organisational chart
Directorate A
Strategy, Policy and 
International Co-operation 
Directorate B
Humanitarian and Civil 
Protection Operations 
Directorate C
Resources, Partnerships 
and Operational Support 
A/1 – Strategy, 
Coordination and Inter–
Institutional Relations 
B/1 – Emergency 
Response
C/1 – Human 
Resources, Security, 
Document 
Management 
A/2 – Information and 
Communication
B/2 – Central Africa, 
Sudan and South 
Sudan
C/2 – Budget, External 
Audit, Informatics
A/3 – Policy and 
Implementation 
Frameworks
B/3 – East, West and 
Southern Africa, Indian 
Ocean
C/3 – Finance, Legal 
Affairs and Partner 
Support 
A/4 – Specific Thematic 
Policies
B/4 – European 
Neighbourhood, 
Middle East, Central 
and South–Western 
Asia
C/4 – Field Network, 
Transport and Logistics
A/5 – Civil Protection 
Policy, Prevention, 
Preparedness and 
Disaster Risk Reduction
B/5 – Asia, Latin 
America, Caribbean, 
Pacific
logistical support to the ongoing operations and projects, and the facilitation of 
donor coordination.130
Within the annually agreed budget, ECHO is free to decide on any activities 
below three million euro. ECHO funding decisions above three million euro are 
made following the “comitology” process, which means that they require approval 
from the Member State representatives in the Humanitarian Aid Committee 
(HAC) and from the European Parliament. Funding for humanitarian aid 
is provided through the European Humanitarian Aid Instrument. In ACP 
countries, some of the EU’s humanitarian aid work can also be financed through 
the European Development Fund (EDF). In 2014, for instance, 30 million 
euro was committed by the EDF to support ECHO’s humanitarian work on 
the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa.131 In addition, ECHO can call upon 
the Emergency Aid Reserve in order to respond to major emergencies that were 
130 See: ECHO Field Network, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/jobs/experts/ECHO_Field_
Network.pdf.
131 Interview with ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
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unforeseeable when the EU budget for humanitarian aid was drawn up.132 In 
2012, for instance, the Emergency Aid Reserve was mobilised to enable swift 
humanitarian action in Syria, Mali and the Sahel.133 In order to ensure a swift 
reaction, emergency funding decisions up to 10 million euro are only subject to 
the interdepartmental consultation procedure within the Commission and only 
need to be sent to the HAC for information within 48 hours of their adoption. 
Emergency funding decisions above 10 million euro require approval by the 
HAC and the European Parliament.
4.2  Interaction between DG ECHO and the Member States: 
addressing the challenge of vertical coherence
At the policy-making level, coordination and interaction between DG ECHO 
and the Member States take place through the Council Working Party on 
Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid (COHAFA). This working group, which acts 
as a forum for discussion on humanitarian aid between the Member States and 
ECHO, meets once a month, with additional meetings taking place in the event 
of major sudden crises. The incoming EU Council Presidency, together with 
ECHO, establish the work plan for the meetings, covering specific humanitarian 
crises and policy issues.134 COHAFA also serves to increase the coordination 
and coherence of the Commission’s and the Member States’ humanitarian aid 
activities. 
The ambition to promote coordination between the Commission and the 
Member States, “both at [the] decision-making level and on the ground”, was 
already mentioned in the 1996 Regulation (Art. 10). At that time, ECHO was 
already better equipped than many EU Member States in terms of staff and 
expertise, most notably through its extensive network of field experts.135 However, 
this coordination commitment was barely implemented. The 2007 European 
Consensus brought the ambition to Europeanise humanitarian aid back to 
the fore, which resulted in the creation of COHAFA as a forum for strategic 
and policy debates on humanitarian aid. While effective coordination remains 
a challenge (see below), notable progress has been made in this regard since 
the establishment of COHAFA in 2009: There is an annual exchange within 
COHAFA on humanitarian aid policies and budgets; the Member States use 
information or analysis provided by ECHO when planning their humanitarian 
interventions; the Member States’ humanitarian aid activities in specific crises 
are better coordinated; and EU positions on specific humanitarian issues are 
132 See: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/flex/flex_en.cfm.
133 See: https://www.eutrainingsite.com/2014-2020.php?id=131.
134 ECHO Annual Report Policy Fiche, 28/05/2013, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/
publications/annual_report/2012/AR2013_policy_fiche_Institutions.pdf.
135 Versluys, European Humanitarian Aid Policy, op.cit.,  21. This is still the case today. Apart from 
the UK, DG ECHO is actually the only European actor working full-time on humanitarian 
matters. Most Member States only have a limited presence in both geographical and temporal 
terms (Pusterla and Pusterla, op.cit., 261).
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discussed ahead of international meetings.136 In addition, a new information 
tool, the European Emergency Disaster Response Information System (EDRIS), 
was created in 2011 to share relevant information and to track ECHO’s and 
the Member States’ humanitarian aid contributions.137 Until recently, however, 
COHAFA struggled to liaise with geographical Council working groups, and via 
these groups, with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), COREPER and 
the Foreign Affairs Council. According to Rosita Šorytė, who acted as COHAFA 
chair during Lithuania’s EU Council Presidency in 2013, communication and 
coordination with other working groups has now improved.138
Nevertheless, important challenges continue to exist. As the Chief of Cabinet 
of former Commissioner Georgieva admitted, there are diverse traditions 
within the Member States, and the Commission does not intend to push them 
too harshly in a certain direction, playing the role of a “facilitator” and “soft 
coordinator” instead.139 Even though this approach may lead to sustainable 
progress in the medium term, the OECD-DAC recommended that the 
Commission take a stronger lead.140 A recent study of the VOICE network 
representing European NGOs also found that, despite the general acceptance of 
the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, there are certain gaps between 
rhetoric and actual practice.141 For example, the Member States tend to be 
influenced more by foreign policy and electoral concerns than by an objective 
needs assessment. Sometimes, this relates to the power of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry over the Development Departments – whereby the development 
sphere is less autonomous at the Member State level than at the EU level. The 
study finds that more could be done to monitor the Member States’ application 
of the consensus in their humanitarian aid policies and recommends that the 
European Parliament could also play a role in this respect. 
4.3  Interaction between DG ECHO and other EU external 
policy actors: addressing the challenge of horizontal 
coherence
ECHO has a specific unit responsible for coordination and inter-institutional 
relations, namely unit A.1. Outside of this unit, inter-institutional contacts with 
other external policy actors mostly take place between the geographical units 
within ECHO and their counterparts within the Commission’s Directorate 
136 ECHO Annual Report Policy Fiche, 28/05/2013, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/
publications/annual_report/2012/AR2013_policy_fiche_Institutions.pdf.
137 See: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/.
138 NGO VOICE, interview with COHAFA Chair Rosita Šorytė, 11 December 2013. See: 
http://eudevdays.eu/news-views/interview-cohafa-chair-rosita-%C5%A1oryt%C4%97#.
VGtfGfmG8dU.
139 EU Governance of Global Emergencies, Conference, Brussels, 22 October 2012.
140 OECD/DAC, op. cit., 96. 
141 VOICE, ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. An NGO Perspective’, May 2014,  
p. 16, available at: http://reliefweb.int/report/world/european-consensus-humanitarian-aid-ngo-
perspective.
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General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and the 
EEAS (see Figure 1). Since the start of the crisis in Syria, for instance, there 
has been a lot of coordination and information-sharing between the respective 
geographical desk officers in ECHO and EEAS.142 As will be indicated in more 
detail in Section 5, ECHO closely cooperates with DEVCO on resilience and 
“linking relief, development and rehabilitation” (LRRD) (see also Figure 1). 
ECHO’s institutional and operational interaction with the EEAS follows the 
procedural guidelines and principles laid down in the “Working Arrangements 
between Commission Services and the EEAS in relation to External Relations 
Issues”.143 The document provides specific guidelines for ECHO-EEAS 
operational co-operation in the field and their institutional cooperation on 
external crises. To begin with, an ECHO field mission or office is required to keep 
close contact with the EU Delegation in the country concerned and regularly 
brief the Head of Delegation to ensure that ECHO’s activities are “compatible” 
with other EU programmes.144 In turn, the Head of Delegation is required to 
involve ECHO employees in internal Delegation meetings, as well as in meetings 
with Member State representatives when these pertain to humanitarian issues. 
S/he is also required to brief them on issues that may be relevant to ECHO’s 
activities.145 However, the Working Arrangement does specify that ECHO field 
offices are only required to liaise with the EU Delegation in so far as this is 
“without prejudice to ECHO’s mandate”.146 In practice, ECHO humanitarian 
experts in the field will be careful in their contacts with the EU Delegations, in 
the sense that they do not want to be closely associated with the EU’s political 
mandate.147 This also means that ECHO will be selective in its information-
sharing with the EU Delegations to avoid compromising the humanitarian 
principles of neutrality and independence.148 Depending on the situation in the 
country and the available space in the EU Delegations, ECHO field offices are 
co-located with the EU Delegations, but this does not change anything about 
their institutional relationship. 
The Working Arrangements between the Commission and the EEAS also 
provide procedural guidelines on ECHO-EEAS cooperation and the exchange 
of information on external crises at the headquarters’ level. With respect to 
crisis response, it is stipulated in the Working Arrangement that “the nature 
of a crisis will determine whether DG ECHO’s Emergency Response Centre 
(ERC), under the authority of the Director-General of DG ECHO, or the 
142 Interview with ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
143 Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS in relation to External 
Relations Issues, SEC(2012)48, 13/1/2012.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Interview with ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
148 Ibid.
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Figure 1: Institutional interaction
EEAS Situation Room, under the authority of the Managing Director for Crisis 
Response, will initiate the exchange of information”. In practice, this means that 
the EEAS takes the initiative in the case of external crises that may affect the 
EU’s security or other interests.149 In such cases, the EEAS Department for Crisis 
Response and Operational Coordination initiates the exchange of information, 
calls the meetings and takes on the task of ensuring a coordinated EU response 
and follow-up. The department will activate the EEAS Crisis Response System, 
which comprises the Crisis Platform, the EU Situation Room and the Crisis 
Management Board. The EEAS Crisis Platform is a forum for ensuring the 
exchange of relevant information across all relevant EU institutions with a view 
to providing the EEAS and the relevant Commission services with clear political 
and/or strategic guidance for responding to a crisis. Depending on the nature 
of a given crisis, the EEAS Crisis Platform can convoke – on an ad-hoc basis – 
various EEAS crisis response/management structures (e.g. Crisis Management 
149 Authors’ interview with DG ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
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and Planning Directorate and EU Military Staff), relevant geographical and 
thematic EEAS Departments, the EU Military Committee and the relevant 
Commission services, including ECHO.
Within the EEAS Crisis Response Department, the Crisis Response Planning 
and Operations division is responsible for the overall planning, organisation 
and coordination of the EU’s crisis response. They also support the EU High 
Representative in her duty to ensure the coherence of the EU’s external action.150 
The EU Situation Room, in turn, is the EEAS’s crises centre, which gathers 
intelligence and provides worldwide monitoring around the clock. It acts as a 
situation information hub for all relevant stakeholders from EU institutions.151
In the case of other crises, such as natural disasters and man-made humanitarian 
crises without strong implications for EU security, it is the Commission that 
will initiate the exchange of information.152 DG ECHO will regularly convene 
meetings with all relevant services, including the EEAS, to exchange relevant 
information about the crisis. This takes place within the framework of ARGUS, 
the Commission’s internal rapid alert system.153 Irrespective of the nature of a 
crisis, DG ECHO is responsible for the coordination of EU civil protection and 
humanitarian assistance, both with Member States and humanitarian partners. 
Coordination with the Member States is managed by the Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) within ECHO. The ERCC was set up in 2013 
to enable a coordinated and faster European response to emergencies across the 
globe via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (EUCPM). Operating around 
the clock, the ERCC continuously monitors risks and emergencies, and thus 
also serves as an EU information and coordination hub during emergencies.154 
It liaises with the Member States through the EUCPM to map the available 
response assets, which the Member States voluntarily want to commit, in order 
to set up a pre-identified pool of the Member States’ response assets that can 
readily be deployed in any major emergency. Once a disaster-stricken country 
has made a request to the EU for emergency assistance, the ERCC activates the 
EUCPM and coordinates the EU’s disaster response efforts by matching Member 
State offers of in-kind assistance to the country’s relief needs.155 The ERCC’s 
coordination efforts also involve pooling shipments from various Member States 
to the affected country.
150 ECHO ERC Factsheet, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/
ERC_en.pdf.
151 Ibid.
152 Authors’ interview with DG ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
153 Ibid.
154 See: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/what/civil-protection/emergency-response-coordination-
centre-ercc.
155 ECHO ERC Factsheet, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/
ERC_en.pdf.
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4.4  Interaction between DG ECHO and the CSDP/military 
aspects156
Despite a traditional reluctance within ECHO to involve military support in its 
humanitarian aid operations, ECHO increasingly sees itself relying on military 
assets.157 Overall, civil-military cooperation in EU humanitarian aid operations 
occurs in two sorts of instances. To begin with, certain humanitarian emergency 
relief situations, and in particular, large-scale natural disasters, such as floods and 
earthquakes, may require specific capabilities or equipment that is exclusively or 
predominantly available from the military, such as emergency evacuations and air 
lifts. A second type of assistance by the military to humanitarian aid operations 
occurs in conflict situations, namely through the protection of civilians and/or 
humanitarian workers. Especially in cases where the government of the affected 
country is no longer able or willing to safeguard security, foreign military may be 
mandated for the provision of safe conditions in which the local population and/
or humanitarian actors can operate. 
ECHO interacts with CSDP military structures at several levels within the 
EU foreign policy system. At the political level, ECHO will engage with 
relevant discussions in the Council, notably through the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and its working groups, the Politico-Military Group (PMG) 
and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Moreover, ECHO represents the 
Commission in the regular weekly meetings of the EUMC. At the strategic, 
conceptual and planning level, ECHO coordinates closely with the EEAS 
crisis management structures, including the Crisis Management and Planning 
Directorate (CMPD), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Since 2010, ECHO has even had a specific 
civil-military relations office, based within Unit A.1. This office will always see 
to it that military assistance in support of EU humanitarian operations abides by 
the internationally agreed MCDA rules158 and Oslo guidelines.159 These rules and 
guidelines were set up in order to ensure that civil-military cooperation preserves 
the humanitarian space (namely by maintaining a clear distinction between 
the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and military 
actors) and does not compromise the humanitarian principles of independence, 
neutrality and impartiality.160 
On the ground, ECHO coordinates with CSDP/military actors at different levels. 
Once a CSDP operation is launched in support of a humanitarian aid mission, 
156 This subsection only looks at the interaction at the institutional level. More details on the 
interaction are provided in subsection 5.1. 
157 ECHO, Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/
what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations.
158 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations 
Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, Rev. 1 (January 2006).
159 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief.
160 ECHO, Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/
what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations.
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ECHO will liaise with the CSDP Operation Headquarters to define general 
guidelines for the interaction between the operation and the humanitarian 
action.161 In addition, ECHO will liaise with the Force Headquarters for daily 
activities, for instance, to reduce the risk of collision. Sometimes, contacts are 
also made between the ECHO field office and EU military personnel operating 
in the field. For the civil-military aspects of the EU’s relief activities in the Central 
African Republic, for instance, ECHO keeps regular contact with the EU Mission 
for the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR). This CSDP military operation 
was set up in June 2014 to contribute to achieving a safe and secure environment 
in the Bangui area as part of international efforts to protect the populations that 
are most at risk and to create the conditions for the provision of humanitarian 
aid.162 ECHO maintains contacts with the Operations Headquarters in Larissa 
(Greece), which manages the military operation.163 Moreover, when relevant, 
meetings are organised with the Operational and Force commanders. 
Through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, ECHO has operational 
arrangements with the EU Military Staff, which allow ECHO to instantly 
mobilise military transport or other assets if civilian means are not sufficient 
to meet the humanitarian needs.164 ECHO made use of this “gap-filling 
mechanism”, for instance, to provide relief during the floods in Pakistan in 
2010 and for the evacuation of third country nationals during the Libya crisis.165 
Through the CPM, ECHO can also rely on Member State military assets for 
Medevac operations.
4.5 ECHO and the Comprehensive Approach: “In but Out”
Interaction between ECHO and the EEAS, including its CSDP and crisis 
management structures, is set to further increase, especially in view of the 
Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises.166 The EU’s 
comprehensive approach, which was launched in 2013 as a Joint Communication 
by the Commission and the High Representative, “sets out a number of concrete 
steps that the EU, collectively, is taking towards an increasingly comprehensive 
approach in its external relations policies and action”, and in particular, to 
external conflict and crises.167 The approach is aimed at all stages of the crisis 
cycle, “through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis 
response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building 
in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term 
161 Ibid.
162 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140951.pdf.
163 Authors’ interview with ECHO official, 6 November 2014.
164 ECHO, Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/
what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations.
165 Ibid.
166 Joint Communication between the Commission and the High Representative to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 11 December 2013, JOIN(2013) 30 final.
167 Ibid., 2.
45SIEPS 2016:3 Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations
development”.168 Following the Council Conclusions of May 2014,169 which 
endorsed the Comprehensive Approach, the Commission and the EEAS 
discussed the operationalisation of the various aspects and goals mentioned in 
the document. One of the goals listed, which directly involves ECHO’s services, 
is the development of shared analysis. To this end, the Joint Communication calls 
for an improvement of the combined situational awareness and analysis capacity, 
in particular, by better linkage between the dedicated facilities in the various EU 
institutions and services, including ECHO’s Emergency Response Coordination 
Centre and the EEAS’ Situation Room.170 In this regard, a shared risk analysis 
tool was recently developed, InfoRM, which enables a global, open-source risk 
assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters.171 Moreover, both the Joint 
Communication and the Council Conclusions call for closer cooperation and 
coordination of the various situation and emergency management centres of the 
EU and the Member States. In addition, the various EU actors involved in crisis 
response and crisis management are encouraged to strengthen information-
sharing, coordination and team-work among all those responsible, both in the 
EU’s Brussels headquarters and in the field (including EU Delegations, CSDP 
missions and operations, Member States and EU Special Representatives).172
Another goal set out in the Joint Communication, which is directly linked to 
ECHO’s services, is to mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU 
in support of a shared vision and common objectives relating to crisis response 
and crisis management. To this end, the Joint Communication calls for a more 
systematic use of the Crisis Platform mechanism, chaired by the EEAS with 
the participation of Commission services, “to facilitate coordination, share 
information and contribute to the identification and intelligent sequencing 
of available EU instruments as required”.173 It also encourages the various 
emergency response functions of the EU to further strengthen their operational 
cooperation, using their complementary expertise.174
The concrete steps and initiatives are outlined in an Action Plan, which was 
jointly prepared by the EEAS and the Commission and was presented to the 
Council in April 2015.175 The Action Plan also identifies pilot projects to which 
the Comprehensive Approach should be applied, including projects in the Sahel, 
the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. 
168 Ibid.
169 Council of the EU, 2014. Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive approach. Foreign 
Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 12 May 2014.
170 Joint Communication, 2013, p.5.
171 See: http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
172 Joint Communication, 2013, p.5.
173 Ibid., 7.
174 Ibid.
175 European Commission and High Representative, Joint Staff Working Document, ‘Taking 
forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises - Action Plan 2015’, 
SWD(2015) 85 final, 10 April 2015, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7913-
2015-INIT/en/pdf.
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ECHO remains a lukewarm supporter of the Comprehensive Approach. While 
ECHO readily commits to more enhanced cooperation with the other EU 
external actors and acknowledges the EU’s view that its external action must be 
coherent, it strongly feels that humanitarian aid should not become simply one 
of the tools in the EU’s external action tool box. Hence, ECHO is in favour of 
achieving a certain culture of cooperation between the various institutions of 
the EU and enhancing information sharing, while ensuring that humanitarian 
aid is not subordinated to other foreign policy instruments and goals. Instead, 
it must continue to be provided on the basis of needs, rather than interests, 
in line with the humanitarian principles.176 In other words, with respect to the 
Comprehensive Approach, ECHO is “In-but-Out”.177
While ECHO will continue to reassert its independence and act as a principled 
donor, it fully realises that, as part of the wider EU action, it is very difficult and 
often almost impossible to achieve this independence and maintain a neutral 
profile, in particular, in conflicts in which the EU unambiguously takes sides, 
such as Ukraine, Somalia and Afghanistan.178 Equally, the tendency of the 
Commissioner responsible for humanitarian aid and the High Representative to 
publish joint press releases (since the Lisbon Treaty) fits with the “comprehensive 
approach”, but it might also undermine the (perceived) neutrality of 
humanitarian aid.
176 Authors’ interview with ECHO official, 6 November 2014; and NGO VOICE, interview with 
COHAFA Chair Rosita Šorytė, 11 December 2013. See: http://eudevdays.eu/news-views/
interview-cohafa-chair-rosita-%C5%A1oryt%C4%97#.VGtfGfmG8dU.
177 ECHO, Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/
what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations.
178 ECHO, Civil-Military Relations in Humanitarian Crises, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/
what/humanitarian-aid/civil-military-relations; authors’ interview with ECHO official,  
6 November 2014.
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5 Humanitarian aid and 
the challenge of policy 
coherence 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, several innovations have been introduced to increase 
the coherence of the EU’s external action. Apart from the creation of new 
institutional functions and structures, the inclusion of a general list of EU external 
action objectives in Art. 21 (1) TEU is of particular significance. Following the 
horizontal application of Article 21 TEU, the objective “to assist populations, 
countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters” – laid down in 
Art. 21 (1) (g) – does not exclusively relate to the EU’s humanitarian aid policy, 
but can, in principle, also be pursued on the basis of other EU policies.179 In 
this respect, the links between humanitarian aid and crisis management (5.1.), 
development (5.2.) and trade (5.3.) deserve particular attention. 
5.1  The nexus between humanitarian aid and crisis 
management operations 
The European Consensus explicitly states that “EU humanitarian aid is not 
a crisis management tool”.180 This also follows from the EU’s humanitarian 
principles mentioned in Article 214 (2) TFEU and the division between CFSP 
and non-CFSP measures under Article 40 TEU (cf. supra). Nevertheless, Article 
43 TEU provides that the Union may use civilian and military means to pursue, 
amongst other things, humanitarian tasks. In other words, whereas Article 
214 TFEU and the European Consensus prohibit humanitarian operations 
from being used for political or military objectives, the opposite is possible. 
Under certain circumstances, measures adopted within the context of the 
EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) may be used to support 
humanitarian operations. This is in line with the horizontal application of Article 
21 (2) (g) (cf. supra). Nevertheless, the use of CSDP instruments in the context 
of humanitarian operations remains controversial. This is particularly the case 
for man-made disasters because of their inherent political dimension. 
In response to natural disasters, civil protection resources can provide an essential 
contribution to humanitarian assistance without any risk to the neutrality and 
impartiality of the latter. With regard to man-made disasters, on the other hand, 
the situation is completely different. For this reason, the European Consensus 
179 According to Art. 21 (3) TEU, the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action, set 
out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this provision, are respected and pursued in the development 
and implementation of the different EU external policies and the external aspects of its other 
policies. 
180 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, OJ (2008) C 25/1 para. 15.
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provides that “in complex emergencies, recourse to civil protection assets should 
rather be the exception”.181 A similar reasoning applies with regard to the use of 
military assets in support of humanitarian actions:
In order to avoid a blurring of lines between military operations and 
humanitarian aid, it is essential that military assets and capabilities are 
used only in very limited circumstances in support of humanitarian relief 
operations as a ‘last resort’, i.e. where there is no comparable civilian 
alternative and only the use of military assets that are unique in capability 
and availability can meet a critical humanitarian need.182 
Respect for international humanitarian law also requires EU military operations 
supporting humanitarian assistance to be subject to strict conditions.183 For 
instance, such operations can only be employed upon request by UNOCHA 
and if all civilian alternatives have been explored and exhausted. Crucially, any 
military assets used under this scenario must remain under civilian coordination 
and must respect the need-based and neutral nature of humanitarian aid. In other 
words, the humanitarian imperative has to be respected under all circumstances. 
A concrete example of the interplay between CSDP activities and humanitarian 
assistance was the adoption by the Council, on 1 April 2011, of Decision 
2011/210/CFSP on a European Union military operation in support of 
humanitarian assistance operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya 
(EUFOR Libya).184 This decision did not imply the immediate employment of 
an EU mission on the ground, but only allowed for further and more detailed 
contingency planning by appointing an EU operation commander (Rear 
Admiral Claudio Gaudiosi) and EU operational headquarters located in Rome. 
The then High Representative, Catherine Ashton, was given the responsibility to 
ensure the consistency with the EU’s external action as a whole, “including the 
Union’s humanitarian aid activities”.185 Significantly, the actual implementation 
of the EUFOR mission required a prior request from UNOCHA and an 
additional decision of the Council. Since the approval from UNOCHA never 
came, EUFOR has never been operational in Libya. 
The preparation of the EUFOR mission with full respect for the European 
Consensus and international humanitarian guidelines has been regarded as 
181 Ibid., para. 60. 
182 Ibid., para. 61. 
183 Those conditions are laid down in the ‘Guidelines on the use of military and civil defense assets 
in disaster relief ’ (Oslo guidelines) and the ‘Guidelines on the use of military and civil defense 
assets to support United Nations humanitarian activities in complex emergencies’ (MCDA 
guidelines). See: European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, OJ (2008) C 25/1, para. 57. 
184 Council Decision 2011/2010/CFSP of 1 April 2011 on a European Union military operation 
in support of humanitarian operations in response to the crisis situation in Libya, OJ (2011) L 
89/17.
185 Article 4 of Decision 2011/210/CFSP.
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a “good practice example that could be used to guide future European civil 
military co-operation”.186 Nevertheless, the Union’s response to the Libyan crisis 
also revealed a number of institutional tensions between the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. Within the EEAS, the 
“Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department” was mandated 
to coordinate the EU’s reaction to the unfolding crisis. This created certain 
frictions with DG ECHO of the European Commission, particularly after the 
Managing Director of the EEAS crisis response unit depicted a visit to Benghazi 
and meetings with the Libyan National Transitional Council as a “humanitarian 
mission”.187
The EU’s response to the crisis in Syria provides another example of the 
increasingly blurred borderline between humanitarian assistance and crisis 
management. On 24 June 2013, the European Commission and the High 
Representative jointly announced “a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian 
crisis”,188 which was later supplemented with the joint communication “elements 
for an EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat”.189 The 
comprehensive EU response has multiple objectives, including the facilitation of 
a political solution to the crisis, the prevention of regional destabilisation and the 
offer of humanitarian assistance. In other words, humanitarian aid is part and 
parcel of a broader EU strategy to tackle the crisis situation in Syria and Iraq. 
Arguably, such an approach entails the risk that EU-funded humanitarian aid 
will be perceived as a foreign policy tool.190 This is particularly the case because 
the plea for more humanitarian aid to Syria came from the EU Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs at the same meeting at which the sanctions against the Syrian 
government were tightened.191 In order to address the humanitarian needs of 
the Syrian civilian population, the EU Member States may exceptionally 
authorise the sale, supply or transfer of key equipment and technology for 
strategic sectors (oil, gas, banking) in Syria. This is only possible under certain 
conditions, including prior consultation with the Syrian National Coalition 
186 OECD/DAC, op. cit., 96. 
187 N. Helwig, P. Ivan, H. Kostanyan, ‘The European External Action Service in the New EU 
Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing Two Years of Practice’ (Brussel: Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2013), 41, available at: www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/7711/pdf. 
188 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Towards a Comprehensive EU 
Approach to the Syrian Crisis’, JOIN (2013) 22, Brussels, 24 June 2013.
189 European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Elements for an EU 
regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da’esh threat’, JOIN (2015) 2 final, Brussels, 6 
February 2015.
190 Pontiroli, A., Ponthieu, A. and Derderian, K., ‘Losing Principles in the Search for Coherence? 
A Field-Based Viewpoint on the EU and Humanitarian Aid’, The Journal of Humanitarian 
Assistance (2013) http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/tag/comprehensive-approach. 
191 Council of the EU, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 22 July 2013, doc. 23584/13.
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for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces.192 Arguably, such a condition puts 
pressure on the basic prerequisite that humanitarian aid should be free from 
any political interference. Even though the Commission’s proposal for a regional 
and comprehensive approach towards Da’esh explicitly states that humanitarian 
aid will be delivered “to vulnerable populations on the basis of needs and in full 
respect of the internationally recognised humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality impartiality and independence”, it also stresses the significance of 
public diplomacy and the visibility of aid in this respect.193 Moreover, the EU’s 
strategy is very explicit in its political objective, which is a political transition in 
Syria, including support for the moderate opposition and increased pressure on 
the Assad regime. 
This type of action explains why the humanitarian community is concerned 
that the further development of EU crisis management capabilities may lead 
to the erosion of humanitarian principles.194 In particular, there is a fear that 
an expanded interpretation of the coordinating role of the EEAS and the 
evolution towards a more comprehensive approach to crisis management may 
lead to a politicisation of humanitarian aid delivery.195 Concrete examples of 
the trend towards a more comprehensive approach are the adoption of strategic 
frameworks for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region.196 Both strategies aim 
to bring together all relevant actors and instruments in order to ensure a more 
coherent EU external action vis-à-vis the respective regions. This involves the 
launch of CSDP missions and the appointment of special representatives.197 
Whereas the general assessment of these strategies is rather positive, there are 
also some implementation issues on the ground. For instance, a European 
Parliament report found that the EU strategy for the Sahel region is “a very 
comprehensive and well-prepared EU strategy document”, which, however, “did 
not lead to satisfactory implementation until the situation in Mali deteriorated 
192 See Arts 6, 10, 16 and 23 of Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning 
restrictive measures against Syria, OJ (2013) L 147/14.
193 JOIN (2015) 2 final. 
194 VOICE briefing paper, ‘EU crisis management – A Humanitarian Perspective’, Brussels, January 
2004. 
195 Conference report ‘From comprehensive approach to comprehensive action: enhancing the 
effectiveness of the EU’s contribution to peace and security’, Wilton Park, 17-18 December 
2012, available at: https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1202-final-report.
pdf. For a discussion and application to the EUFOR mission in Chad, see J. Orbie and K. Del 
Biondo, ‘The European Union’s “Comprehensive Approach” in Chad: Securitisation and/or 
Compartmentalisation?’, 29 Global Society 2 (2015). 
196 Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, Brussels, 14 November 2011, available at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/126052.pdf; EEAS, 
‘Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel’, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/
africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf.
197 In the Horn of Africa, three operations were set up: a counter-piracy operation (EUNAFOR 
Atalanta), a training mission for Somali soldiers (EUTM Somalia) and a coastguard training 
mission for countries in the region (EUCAP NESTOR). In the Sahel region, CSDP missions 
were launched in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger) and Mali (EU Training Mission – EUTM). 
Mr. Alexander Rondos was appointed EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa; Mr. 
Michel Dominique Reveyrand-de Menthon fulfills this task for the Sahel region. 
51SIEPS 2016:3 Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations
dramatically”.198 Moreover, the report concluded that the potential of the Lisbon 
Treaty innovations, such as the coordinating role of the High Representative and 
the EEAS, has not been fully exploited. In particular, the Commission’s services 
appeared to adopt a restrictive approach “protecting its own competences 
and minimising coordination functions with the EEAS”. Even though the 
humanitarian principles necessarily imply a more cautious approach as far 
as DG ECHO is concerned, it was nevertheless stressed that this service “is 
still part of the EU and, consequently, […] more should be done to enhance 
cooperation and coordination between ECHO and the EEAS”.199 Hence, a 
certain tension can be observed between the preoccupation of humanitarian aid 
workers and DG ECHO with ensuring that humanitarian assistance remains 
free from any political interference, on the one hand, and the ambition of more 
policy coherence in the EU’s response to complex emergencies in line with the 
objectives of the Lisbon Treaty provisions and the EU’s comprehensive approach 
to external conflicts and crises, on the other. 
5.2  The nexus between humanitarian aid and development 
policy
As humanitarian aid and development cooperation are inherently intertwined, 
it is often difficult to identify an exact boundary between the ad-hoc assistance 
under Article 214 TFEU and the structural assistance under Article 208 TFEU. 
The changing global context – the increase in major disasters, the destructive 
effects of climate change and the increasingly complex crises200 – is requiring 
EU humanitarian and development actors to cooperate more closely, as large-
scale emergencies affect the stability of livelihoods and communities’ longer-
term development prospects. In order to address the “grey zone” between short-
term humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid, the European 
Commission has been engaged in the global initiative on Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD).201 The concept of LRRD goes back to 
the 1980s, when practitioners and scholars detected a funding and operational 
gap between humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development activities 
in Western response efforts to the African food crisis. LRRD covers the measures 
and interventions developed to fill those gaps, and creates synergies between 
short-term and long-term assistance. Although it was not until 1996 that the 
Commission issued its first Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Development, it has been a leading actor in that field ever since.
198 European Parliament Report on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the 
coherence of EU external action, 21 February 2014, A7-0138/2014, para. 39.
199 Ibid., para. 20.
200 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
‘Towards the World Humanitarian Summit: A global partnership for principled and effective 
humanitarian action’, COM (2015) 419 final, p. 2.
201 European Commission communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD), Brussels, 30.04.1996, COM (96) 153final; European Commission communication on 
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment. Brussels, 23.04.2001, COM 
(2001) 153 final. 
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The EU has supported LRRD in several ways. To begin with, it has committed 
to the concept in its policy documents. LRRD is highlighted, for instance, in 
the 2007 Commission Communication towards an EU response to situations of 
fragility202 and in the 2006 Strategy for food security,203 which sets out to guarantee 
food security in transition periods by developing LRRD country strategies. The 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid endorses the concept of LRRD 
by emphasising that “achieving better linkage between Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Development (LRRD) requires humanitarian and development actors to 
coordinate from the earliest phases of a crisis response and to act in parallel with 
a view to ensuring a smooth transition. It necessitates mutual awareness of the 
different modalities, instruments and approaches on the part of all aid actors and 
flexible and innovative transition strategies”.204 The Action Plan accompanying 
the Consensus singled out a number of measures to improve the link between 
humanitarian aid and longer-term development.205 However, the 2010 mid-term 
review of the Action Plan concluded that only limited progress had been made 
on LRRD.206
Apart from committing to the concept in its policy documents, the EU has 
developed specific mechanisms to support LRRD and to smooth the transition 
between the different types of assistance. In 2003, an Inter-Service group on 
Transition, co-chaired by DG ECHO and EuropeAid, was created to ensure a 
more coherent approach, but in practice, the inter-service group has not been 
very functional.207
In addition, the EU has incorporated legal provisions on LRRD in several of 
its financing instruments, namely in the Instrument for Humanitarian Aid, the 
Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Stability and the 
European Development Fund (EDF). The 2010 revised Cotonou agreement 
also contains legal provisions on LRRD, namely articles 60, 72, 72a and annex 
IV.208 DG ECHO can use up to a quarter of the so-called B-Envelope of the EDF 
to implement actions designed to phase out humanitarian aid and support the 
transition from short-term relief to rehabilitation and development.209 Moreover, 
the EU can transfer EDF funds from Envelope-A to ECHO in cases where EU 
202 European Commission Communication towards an EU response to situations of fragility, COM 
(2007) 643.
203 A Thematic Strategy for Food Security, COM (2006) 21.
204 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. OJ C 25, 30.1.2008.
205 Action Plan. SEC/2008/1991, 29.5.2008.
206 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The 
mid-term review of the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid Action Plan: implementing 
effective, principled EU humanitarian action, COM(2010) 722, 8.12.2010.
207 P. Morazán, F. Grünewald, I. Knoke and T. Schäfer, Strengthening the Link between Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the EU’s Financing Instruments for Development and 
Humanitarian Aid under the MFF 2014-220, study requested by the European Parliament’s 
Subcommittee on Security and Defence Committee on Development, August 2012, 18.
208 Cotonou agreement, 3rd revision of 22 June 2010.
209 Morazán et al., op.cit., 14.
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development programming is not yet feasible. For Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, 
EDF funds were transferred in 2014 to finance ECHO operations supporting 
the health sector within the “Partnership for Transition” LRRD initiative in 
order to facilitate the transition from humanitarian aid to public funding of the 
health sector.210
So far, however, it has been difficult for the EU to implement LRRD in practice. 
Moreover, several evaluations indicate that LRRD has mostly been implemented 
ad-hoc, rather than systematically.211 Synergies between DG ECHO and DG 
Development in the “grey zone” of rehabilitation have furthermore proven to 
be difficult to achieve.212 This is related to the different views and goals of the 
development and humanitarian actors within the EU, but also to institutional 
and operational obstacles, including the lack of flexibility of the development 
financing instruments and divergent implementation modes and timeframes.213 
In its post-emergency assistance after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, for instance, 
the EU experienced significant problems when dealing with the transition towards 
long-term development.214 Several studies have shown that relief, rehabilitation 
and development were not sufficiently linked, and revealed a considerable 
funding gap between short-term relief and long-term development.215 This 
was partly because the 10th EDF was not adequately adapted to such post-
emergency situations.216 Moreover, according to an evaluation of the Court of 
Auditors, ECHO and DEVCO did not have “a clear common country strategy 
on LRRD to optimise the synergy and smooth transition between their respective 
activities”.217 There was also insufficient coordination between ECHO and the 
EU delegation. 
Former Development Commissioner Piebalgs and former Humanitarian Aid 
Commissioner Georgieva admitted that the EU’s approach to LRRD could be 
improved in terms of concrete output on the ground, for example, by making 
210 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2014/HIPs/cote_ivoire_en.pdf.
211 V. Ramet, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development: Towards More Effective Aid, study 
commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Development, July 2012, 7.
212 Versluys, ‘European Humanitarian Aid: Lifesaver or Political Tool?’, op. cit., 105; K. 
Koddenbrock and M. Büttner, ‘The Will to Bridge? European Commission and U.S. 
Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’, in: Humanitarian Assistance. 
Improving U.S. European Cooperation (2009), 127-129, available at: <http://www.gppi.net/
fileadmin/gppi/RTB_book_chp8.pdf>; Bretherton and Vogler, op. cit., 131-132.
213 Koddenbrock and Büttner, op. cit., 127-129; Morazán et al., op. cit., 18.
214 Ramet, op.cit, 7; G. Werleigh and E. J. Brouwer, ‘How to help Haiti help itself ’, European Voice, 
13 January 2011.
215 Court of Auditors, EU support for rehabilitation following the earthquake in Haiti, Special Report, 
No. 13, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014; Morazán et al., op. cit., 
25; Ramet, op. cit., 7.
216 Ramet, op.cit., 8.
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the EU’s funding tools more flexible.218 Humanitarian NGOs have called for an 
increased political commitment to LRRD, an Action Plan with clear definitions 
and concrete measures for progress, and adequate funding mechanisms.219
In the last few years, attention has been increasingly steered towards “resilience”. 
Resilience is defined by the EU as “the ability of an individual, a household, a 
community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover 
from stresses and shocks”.220 As such, it requires a comprehensive approach that 
includes adequate risk assessment tools, a focus on prevention and preparedness, 
and an enhanced response to crises. A policy based on enhancing resilience implies 
that the donors do not just intervene to address the consequences of emergency 
crises, but that they also tackle the root causes of recurrent crises.221 Since this 
requires a coherent approach between humanitarian aid and development 
assistance, the concept of resilience has been central to debates about improving 
the EU’s LRRD policy. In contrast to previous LRRD initiatives, it puts more 
emphasis on the role of the recipient side in EU interventions, as it seeks to 
enhance local emergency response and prevention capacities.222 
Following the release of a Commission Communication on resilience in 2012, a 
Resilience Action Plan was launched in 2013.223 Drawing on the EU’s experience 
with addressing recurrent food crises, mainly in the Sahel and the Horn of 
Africa, the Action Plan sets out a framework to deliver early results and improve 
approaches and tools to help vulnerable communities in crisis-prone situations 
to build resilience to future shocks, bringing together humanitarian action, 
long-term development cooperation and on-going political engagement.224 The 
concept enjoys broad international support, and the approach outlined by the 
Commission is also strongly endorsed by both the Parliament and the Council.225
218 A. Piebalgs, ‘Haiti, one year after: Keeping our promises and accelerating our efforts’, speech 
at the conference ‘Haiti, One Year after the Earthquake’, Brussels, Egmont Palace, 23 February 
2011; K. Georgieva, ‘Policy Priorities – achievements and mapping the ways ahead’, speech at 
the Development Committee of the European Parliament, 25 May 2011.
219 V. Hauck, ‘What can bridge the divide between humanitarian aid and development?’, ECDPM 
Talking Point, 19 September 2012, available at: http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/what-can-
bridge-the-divide-between-humanitarian-aid-and-development.
220 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘The EU 
Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises’, Brussels, 3.10.2012, COM (2012) 
586, 5.
221 Ibid., 2.
222 See e.g. Public Hearing in the European Parliament about LRRD, 3 September 2012.
223 Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020, Brussels, SWD (2013) 227 
final, 19.6.2013.
224 Ibid.
225 See e.g. Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Resilience, 3241st Foreign Affairs Council 
Meeting, Brussels, 28.5.2013; European Parliament, Draft Report on the EU Approach to 
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The budget available to implement the resilience strategy is allocated to a 
wide range of measures, including school-based disaster preparedness sessions, 
land resource management for rural and pastoralist communities, supporting 
vulnerable livelihoods dependent on livestock to increase their income 
opportunities and designing sustainable solutions for refugee crises.226 In Kenya, 
for instance, the EU has contributed to an improved early warning system for 
droughts and has supported community-level livelihood projects focussed on 
enhancing people’s economic opportunities.227
The activities in Kenya are part of the “Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience” 
(SHARE) programme. Together with the “Alliance Globale pour l’Initiative 
Résilience Sahel” (AGIR), it is considered a flagship initiative in the EU’s 
approach to resilience.228 The EU’s goal is to further elaborate its resilience 
strategy by building on the experience gained through those two programmes. 
Launched in the wake of the severe food crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011, the 
SHARE programme seeks to enhance resilience “by increasing the opportunities 
of farming and pastoralist communities to make a living, and also enhance the 
capacity of public services to respond to crises”.229 
However, while the EU’s new resilience strategy is generally being lauded, its 
full potential, including that of flagship programmes such as SHARE, still 
remains to be seen. In the case of Somalia, for instance, some warn that the EU’s 
resilience approach might not be apt for the realities on the ground and lacks a 
thorough understanding of the country’s socio-political complexity and conflict-
prone dynamics, thereby risking the further aggravation of the situation instead 
of improving it.230 Moreover, as claimed by the same authors, the value-added 
of SHARE “is mainly perceived [by the EU] to be a ‘pillar’ or a ‘component’, 
complementing other, political and security, pillars of the EU’s comprehensive 
framework”.231 Similarly, some have denounced resilience as “a new buzzword 
of a floundering aid system, pushed by donors increasingly looking for cost 
effectiveness and a way to marry all components of aid to a process of state 
226 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience_en.pdf.
227 COM (2012) 586, 10.
228 COM (2012) 586, 7; VOICE-CONCORD position paper ‘Linking Relief Rehabilitation and 
Development: Towards a more joined up approach enhancing resilience and impact’, July 2012; 
Morazán et al., op. cit., 23.
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230 T. Henökl and C. Webersik, ‘The Impact of Institutional Change on Foreign Policy-Making: 
The Case of the EU Horn of Africa Strategy’, 19 (4) European Foreign Affairs Review 532 (2014), 
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building”.232 Therefore, it could be argued that the resilience concept is at odds 
with a core humanitarian approach to crises.233
5.3 The nexus between humanitarian aid and trade policy
Also, with respect to the EU’s common commercial policy, the Lisbon Treaty 
stipulates that it “shall be conducted in the context of the principles and 
objectives of the Union’s external action” (Art 207 (1) TFEU). Whereas a lot of 
attention has gone to the coherence of the EU’s trade policy with its development 
objectives, there are not many instances of the EU deliberately using its trade 
instruments as a response to humanitarian crises. Two examples are worth 
mentioning, one before and one after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
However, the humanitarian motives behind each of them should be nuanced. 
First, the European Commission attempted to accelerate the entry into force 
of beneficial trade preferences for countries that suffered from the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami. When the Tsunami took place, the Commission and Council 
were already negotiating a revised Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that 
would be more generous in terms of access to the EU market compared to the 
previous system. The new GSP was expected to come into force on 1 July 2005. 
In a reaction to the Tsunami, the then Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
proposed to advance the starting date to 1 April.234 As a result, countries that 
were hit by the Tsunami, such as Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia, would 
benefit more quickly from more favourable tariffs for export products, such as 
shrimp, textiles and clothing. All of the Member States were in favour of the 
Commission’s Tsunami proposal. Eventually, the Council’s approval of the new 
GSP was delayed, but not because of disagreements on this “humanitarian” 
trade initiative.235 Therefore, this potentially coherent link between humanitarian 
aid and trade policy never materialised. In any case, its impact was likely to be 
modest and temporary. The Commission’s Tsunami proposal can also be seen as 
a strategic manoeuvre aimed at facilitating the approval of the new GSP, which 
would further liberalise the EU market for imports from developing countries 
(not only those affected by the Tsunami). 
232 J. Whittall, M. Philips and M. Hofman, ‘Opinion and Debate: Building Resilience by 
Deconstructing Humanitarian Aid’, Doctors without Borders, 7 February 2014. Available 
at: http://www.msf.org.uk/article/opinionand-debate-building-resilience-deconstructing-
humanitarian-aid; also see: J. Joseph, ‘The EU in the Horn of Africa: Building Resilience as a 
Distant Form of Governance’, 52 (2) JCMS (2014), 285-301.
233 C. Dany, op. cit., 434-5.
234 Commission Communication concerning amendment of the Commission’s proposal for a 
Council Regulation applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 
2005 to 31 December 2008, Brussels,10.02.2005, COM (2005) 43final.
235 There were disagreements about the graduation threshold for textiles from India. Agence Europe 
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Second, the European Council proposed improving Pakistan’s access to the EU 
market in reaction to the devastating floods in 2010.236 This time, the proposed trade 
instrument was not the GSP, but “autonomous trade preferences”. Autonomous 
trade preferences are rather exceptional in the EU’s trade policy. According to the 
Commission’s website, they “are granted by the EU on a temporary basis, taking 
into account the specific situation of the different countries covered”.237 They 
have been granted to countries in the European neighbourhood for a number of 
economic and clearly political reasons: to Moldova (since 2008) because it would 
be harmed by Romania’s accession to the EU and in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, to the Western Balkans countries (since 2009) in the 
framework of the Stabilization and Association Agreements, and since 2014, 
to Ukraine in order to advance the implementation of the tariff liberalisation 
provided under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and against 
the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
The European Council’s proposal to use a trade policy instrument for the 
achievement of a humanitarian objective seems fully in line with the rationale 
of Article 21 TEU and the Lisbon Treaty to increase the coherence of the EU’s 
external action. The European Commission quickly drafted a proposal for 
regulation.238 The proposed preferences would liberalise an additional number 
of 75 tariff lines (compared to normal GSP) “specific to Pakistan’s core export 
sectors in those areas worst hit by the floods”.239 Nonetheless, the initiative faced 
significant legal and political obstacles. It was challenged by several members of 
the European Parliament, as well as by Member States that feared competition 
for their import-sensitive industries (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain). They 
raised concerns about the economic implications for the EU’s textiles and 
ethanol industries, and about the absence of any political conditionality in the 
Commission’s proposal.240 The European Parliament only accepted the proposed 
regulation after the introduction of an economic safeguard clause (Art.4), the 
limitation of the duration of the preferential trade measures (Art.11) and the 
inclusion of explicit political conditionality provisions. For instance, Pakistan 
would only be entitled to benefit from the preferential arrangements if it does 
not engage in “serious and systematic violations of human rights, including 
core labour rights, fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law” 
(Art.2).241 
236 European Council Conclusions, 16 September 2010, Annex II, Declaration on Pakistan, 
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The latter point is of particular interest, taking into account the humanitarian 
rationale for the trade initiative. According to the humanitarian principle of 
independence, aid to people in need cannot be subject to any political, economic 
or military conditions (cf. supra section 3). Adding such conditions to the granting 
of temporary autonomous trade preferences adopted to address an emergency 
situation would thus, arguably, contradict the spirit, the nature and the purpose 
of the proposed measure.242 On the other hand, the measure is adopted in the 
context of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) under the legal basis 
of Article 207(2) TFEU and not as part of the EU’s humanitarian assistance 
under Article 214 TFEU. That being the case, the humanitarian principles laid 
down in Article 214(2) TFEU and reflected in the European Consensus do not 
automatically apply to this type of measure. Within the context of the CCP, 
the granting of trade preferences can be made conditional upon respect for 
fundamental rights.243 Moreover, the political conditionality provisions in the 
autonomous trade preferences for Pakistan are similar to the GSP conditionality. 
Also, the GSP regulation, from which Pakistan already benefits, provides that 
trade preferences can be withdrawn in case of serious and systematic violations of 
a number of international conventions relating to human rights and core labour 
rights. Thus, this was not a new condition for Pakistan, which already benefited 
from the standard GSP.
Problems with the EU’s initiative to support Pakistan also emerged at the level of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since autonomous trade preferences are 
typically provided on a rather ad hoc basis for a number of particular political 
and economic reasons, their compatibility with international trade law is often 
contestable. The unilateral introduction of trade preferences to Pakistan would 
be in breach of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle (Article I(1) GATT) 
and of the principle of non-discriminatory administration of quantitative 
restrictions (Article XIII GATT), because other developing countries would not 
benefit from the same trade liberalisation scheme. Therefore, the EU had to 
request a waiver from the application of those provisions in accordance with 
Article IX of the Agreement establishing the WTO. A first attempt to obtain 
such a waiver, which requires consensus within the WTO Council for Trade in 
Goods, failed due to resistance from Pakistan’s neighbours. India argued that the 
EU proposal would help Pakistan’s textile industry, not flood victims.244 Only the 
242 See, in this respect, the intervention of Commissioner Nellie Kroes during the Parliamentary 
debates, 9 May 2011. 
243 However, granting trade preferences for reasons related to foreign policy may not always be 
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(WTO Appellate Body Report, W T/DS246/AB/R, 20 April 2004). See e.g. L. Bartels, ‘The 
WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement’, 10 (4) Journal of International Economic 
Law (2007), 869-886; I. Govaere and A. Van Bossuyt, ‘Le commerce à visage de plus en plus 
humain? Les droits de l’homme dans la politique commerciale commune’, in: M. Candela 
Soriano (ed.), Les droits de l’homme dans les politiques de l’Union européenne (Brussels: De Boeck/
Larcier, 2006), 225-254.
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59SIEPS 2016:3 Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations
introduction of further amendments, including the increased use of tariff rate 
quotas instead of full liberalisation, led to the acceptance of the EU’s waiver.245 
Because of these disagreements, it took until more than two years after the 
catastrophic events before only a watered down version of the Commission’s 
proposal was adopted.246 The Regulation expired on 31 December 2013. It 
provides that by the end of 2015 at the latest, the Commission should submit 
a report on the effects “in terms of job creation, poverty eradication and the 
sustainable development of Pakistan’s working population and poor”.247 Given 
the more limited scope, as well as the shorter duration of the trade preferences, 
their impact is likely to be limited.248 Since MEPs also managed to insert a 
statement in the regulation saying that the measure is not a precedent for the 
EU’s trade policy, but strictly a response to the specific situation in Pakistan, it 
seems unlikely that there would be many more cases whereby trade preferences 
are used in the context of humanitarian crises. 
However, it can be questioned whether humanitarian motives were the main 
impetus behind the proposed emergency trade preferences for Pakistan. The 
country’s geostrategic importance for the EU and its unsatisfactory access to 
the EU market under the GSP seem to be more important considerations.249 
Even the Council Regulation explicitly states that the EU’s response to the 
disaster should “take into account the geostrategic importance of Pakistan’s 
partnership with the Union, mainly through Pakistan’s key role in the fight 
against terrorism, while contributing to the overall development, security and 
stability of the region”.250 Moreover, within the European Commission’s DG 
Trade, some officials were dissatisfied with what they considered undue influence 
from the European Council, and in particular, the UK government, because of 
geopolitical considerations.251 It should be noticed that the EU is a founding 
member of the “Friends of Democratic Pakistan” group within the United 
Nations National Assembly.252 There are also a number of historical antecedents 
that lend further support to the thesis that the EU’s granting of additional 
market access to Pakistan fits within a broader foreign policy agenda, rather than 
245 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/good_02feb12_e.htm (accessed 1 May 2013). 
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Humanitarian Trade Preferences for Pakistan: A Case Study in Multifaceted Protectionism’, 46 
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economic or developmental concerns. First, in 1997, the EU ignored a request by 
international trade union movements to withdraw GSP trade preferences from 
Pakistan because of child labour and forced labour practices. The EU’s failure to 
apply sanctions at the time was, according to some sources, related to Pakistan’s 
geostrategic and economic importance for the EU.253 Second, in November 
2011, the EU decided to grant even more favourable trade preferences to 
Pakistan. The additional market access was officially because of the government’s 
role in the fight against drugs production and trafficking, but in fact, it was a 
barely veiled attempt to reward Pakistan for its role in the fight against terrorism. 
Because of its lack of an objective economic or developmental basis, this decision 
was successfully challenged by India at the WTO.254 Third, in 2012, when the 
European Commission proposed its new GSP regulation, the vulnerability 
criterion for the eligibility of the “GSP+ scheme”, which grants even more trade 
preferences to countries ratifying and effectively implementing sixteen human 
rights conventions and several conventions on the environment and governance, 
was relaxed from 1% to 2%. The implication of this seemingly small adjustment 
is that Pakistan also became eligible for the GSP+. Subsequently, Pakistan 
successfully applied for the GSP+ scheme. Since 1 January 2014, Pakistan has 
received the GSP+ preferences, so that its privileged access to the EU market 
will continue after the expiry of the “flood” preferences. It remains to be seen 
the extent to which this implies that the country will effectively implement 
the relevant human rights convention, including the moratorium on the death 
penalty, and the extent to which the recent practices of capital punishment (in 
December 2014, following the massacre of school children by the Taliban) will 
impact the EU’s views on whether Pakistan is entitled to receive the GSP+ trade 
preferences. 
Because of Pakistan’s geopolitical importance, there has been one case preventing 
the withdrawal of trade preferences, and three cases attempting to extend trade 
preferences beyond the standard GSP tariffs (the drugs GSP system, the floods 
initiative, and finally, the GSP+). As in the case of the Tsunami initiative, the 
“humanitarian” trade initiative proved to be instrumental for advancing a 
broader trade or security-related agenda.
In conclusion, the Pakistan case demonstrates that the EU’s trade policy may be 
used as an instrument to promote humanitarian objectives in the wake of a global 
emergency. However, it also shows the limits and challenges to such an approach. 
Moreover, the final EU Regulation does not safeguard the independence of the 
humanitarian initiative, given the introduction of conditionality and safeguard 
clauses.
253 T. Greven, Social Standards in Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment 
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6 Conclusion and policy 
recommendations
The EU’s humanitarian aid policy has progressively expanded over the previous 
decades. As was illustrated in the historical overview, this has involved (i) a 
substantive shift from natural to man-made disasters; (ii) a geographical shift 
from the ACP group to all third countries; (iii) an institutional shift from 
fragmentation to a centralised office within the European Commission; (iv) 
a bureaucratic shift of ECHO from an office to a separate DG within the 
Commission and the further professionalisation of ECHO; (v) an increase in 
policy initiatives, including LRRD, DRR and a Voluntary Corps; (vi) a growing 
ambition to Europeanise the Member States’ national humanitarian aid policies; 
(vii) an increased budget; and last but not least, (viii) a strengthening of the legal 
basis from a Council Regulation (with development aid as its legal basis), over a 
political document (the Humanitarian Consensus), to primary law (the ill-fated 
Constitutional Treaty, and finally, the Lisbon Treaty).
Despite the EU’s long-standing international involvement as a humanitarian 
assistance donor, it is only with the Treaty of Lisbon that a specific provision 
devoted to humanitarian aid has been introduced into the primary legal 
framework of the EU. Accordingly, the granting of “ad hoc assistance and relief 
and protection for people in third countries who are victims of natural and 
man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from 
these different situations” is now indisputably an EU external policy in its own 
right. With this explicit recognition, the Treaty of Lisbon underlines the separate 
nature of humanitarian aid in comparison to other external policies, such as 
development co-operation or CFSP. 
While the Lisbon Treaty raises the profile of humanitarian aid as a separate 
external policy of the Union, it also aims to increase the coherence of the EU’s 
external action and offers new institutional and legal provisions to combine 
humanitarian aid activities with other external action instruments and 
institutions. Within the post-Lisbon institutional setting, a lot of attention has 
been focused on finding ways to provide a more coherent and comprehensive 
response to crises and large-scale disasters. However, the implications of the 
new institutional and legal provisions to combine humanitarian aid activities 
with other external action instruments and institutions are not uncontested, as 
enhanced coordination and cooperation may undermine the independence and 
distinct status of humanitarian aid policy. The actors involved in humanitarian 
assistance, foreign policy, development and trade each have different agendas; 
they pursue different principles and objectives, and diverge regarding the levels 
and modalities of intervention. For humanitarian aid policy, this means that 
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the quest for more coherence may come at the expense of the humanitarian aid 
principles to which the EU is committed.
In principle, there are sufficient safeguards to protect the independence of the 
EU’s humanitarian operations. Decision-making in the field of humanitarian 
aid is still essentially steered by DG ECHO of the Commission. The integration 
of civil protection functions into the activities of DG ECHO has improved 
the coherence of the EU’s strategy for crisis response and its relations with the 
EEAS do not appear to have undermined the fundamental role of humanitarian 
principles. Moreover, there is increased cooperation with the Member States 
through institutional structures such as COHAFA and EDRIS. Nevertheless, 
several issues continue to exist. 
First, the trend towards a more comprehensive approach to crisis management, 
including a more active coordinating role for the EEAS, may lead to further 
institutional tensions with DG ECHO. A clear-cut division of responsibilities, 
as well as a sufficient awareness of the humanitarian aid specificities among all of 
the actors, are crucial to ensuring effective cooperation on the ground. For this 
purpose, an action plan to spread the knowledge about the European Consensus 
and systematic information exchanges with the NGOs that are active on the 
ground are recommended.255 More generally, a re-assessment of the European 
Consensus and Council Regulation 1257/96 could help to reframe the EU’s 
humanitarian aid policy in light of Article 214 TFEU.256 The Regulation, in 
particular, was adopted in a completely different context and on the disputable 
legal basis of development assistance. An up-to-date version of the Regulation 
– based on Article 214 TFEU – could be useful to more clearly spell out the 
independent and coordinating role of DG ECHO and its relations with other 
institutional actions such as the EEAS. 
Second, in order to be effective, humanitarian aid must not only be neutral, 
but also must be perceived as such. The EU’s increasing involvement in crisis 
management operations and the publishing of joint press releases on behalf 
of the High Representative and the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid 
put this perception under pressure. For this reason, the internal institutional 
independence of DG ECHO should also be made visible externally. For this 
purpose, ECHO could consider adopting a new logo allowing a clear distinction 
from other actors, such as EUFOR missions or election observation missions.257 
255 See also, on this point, the recommendations included in the VOICE study ‘The European 
Consensus and Humanitarian Aid: An NGO Perspective’, May 2014, available at: http://
daraint.org/2014/05/23/5133/report-european-consensus-humanitarian-aid-ngo-perspective/. 
256 It is noteworthy that according to Enrique Guerrero, the European Parliament’s standing 
rapporteur on humanitarian assistance, “there are many actors in humanitarian aid who fear 
that if we open this discussion [i.e. on a revision of the Consensus] the risks will be higher than 
the opportunities especially when EU Member States are reducing their budgets”. See: VOICE 
Newsletter, May 2015, p. 17. 
257 This recommendation can also be found in OECD/DAC, op. cit., 98. 
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Third, there has still been little practical progress on linking emergency aid, 
rehabilitation and development. Further, in this area, it is important that all of 
the actors involved, both in Brussels and in the delegations, understand each 
other’s principles, objectives and modalities, and agree on a common framework 
for action.
Fourth, the ambition of the Lisbon Treaty to facilitate the combination of 
different policy instruments in response to global emergencies faces political 
and legal obstacles. This has been clearly illustrated with the Pakistan case, 
where the temporary introduction of autonomous trade preferences faced 
strong opposition, both within the EU and at the level of the WTO. Taking 
into account the humanitarian principles, as well as international trade law, the 
EU should develop clear guidelines about the conditions under which trade 
instruments can be used for humanitarian purposes. In doing so, it would be 
important to avoid the perception (accurate or not) that economic or foreign 
policy considerations determine when so-called humanitarian concerns inform 
trade policy decisions. 
Fifth, a lot of effort has gone into strengthening the institutionalisation of an 
EU humanitarian aid policy, but surprisingly little attention has been devoted 
to assessing the effectiveness of the EU’s humanitarian aid efforts. As was 
recognised by the European Commission in its preparations for the first World 
Humanitarian Summit, which will take place in Istanbul in May 2016, “there 
are no reliable and comparable assessments of humanitarian needs”.258 As a result, 
humanitarian aid risks being driven by an institutional competition for funds 
with investments in the most visible humanitarian crises. In order to ensure full 
respect for the humanitarian imperative, “there is a need for common tools to 
measure whether the assistance addresses actual needs and brings the expected 
impact”.259 
In sum, it appears that the EU is a key player when it comes to providing and 
coordinating humanitarian assistance, but difficulties remain regarding the 
integration of humanitarian aid programmes into more comprehensive strategies 
of disaster response, especially because this trend towards a comprehensive 
approach puts the humanitarian principles under pressure. 
258 COM (2015) 419 final, p. 6. 
259 Ibid. 
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Annex 1
Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) 
HUMANITARIAN AID
Article 214
1. The Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be 
conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of 
the external action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended 
to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection for people in 
third countries who are victims of natural or man-made disasters, in 
order to meet the humanitarian needs resulting from these different 
situations. The Union’s measures and those of the Member States shall 
complement and reinforce each other.
2. Humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance 
with the principles of international law and with the principles of 
impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination.
3. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures 
defining the framework within which the Union’s humanitarian aid 
operations shall be implemented.
4. The Union may conclude with third countries and competent 
international organisations any agreement helping to achieve the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1 and in Article 21 of the Treaty on 
European Union. The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to 
Member States’ competence to negotiate in international bodies and 
to conclude agreements.
5. In order to establish a framework for joint contributions from 
young Europeans to the humanitarian aid operations of the Union, 
a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps shall be set up. The 
European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall determine 
the rules and procedures for the operation of the Corps.
6. The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote 
coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member 
States, in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of 
Union and national humanitarian aid measures.
7. The Union shall ensure that its humanitarian aid operations are 
coordinated and consistent with those of international organisations 
and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United Nations 
system.
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Annex 2
Table 2:  Overview of Commissioners responsible for 
humanitarian aid
European 
Commission
Responsible 
Commissioner for 
Humanitarian Aid
Portfolio of the responsible 
Commissioner
Juncker 
2014–
Christos Stylianides Humanitarian aid and crisis 
management 
Development Commissioner: Neven 
Mimica
Barroso II
2009–2014
Kristalina Georgieva International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Crisis 
Response
Development Commissioner: 
Andris Piebalgs
Barroso II
2004–2009
Louis Michel Development and Humanitarian 
Aid
Prodi
1999–2004
Poul Nielson Development and Humanitarian 
Aid
Santer
1995–1999
Emma Bonino Consumer Policy, Fisheries and 
ECHO
Development Commissioner: João de 
Deus Pinheiro
Delors III
1992–1994
Manuel Marin Cooperation, development and 
humanitarian aid
Before Delors III
1969–1991
Scattered over 
different Directorate 
Generals
Agriculture, Development, 
External Relations...
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Svensk sammanfattning260 
Syftet med denna rapport är att kartlägga de särskiljande dragen i EU:s 
humanitära bistånd som ett enskilt externt EU-politiskt sakområde och sedan 
analysera hur detta kan förenas med Lissabonfördraget och dess ambition att 
göra EU till en mer sammanhållen extern aktör.
EU:s biståndspolitik har successivt utvidgats under de senaste årtiondena. Det 
började inom ramen för relationerna till AVS-staterna (Afrika, Västindien och 
Stillahavsområdet) och utan en tydlig rättslig grund i fördragen. 1991 skapades 
Generaldirektoratet för humanitärt bistånd och civilskydd (ECHO), en separat 
institutionell tjänst för humanitärt bistånd, vilket bidrog till att humanitär 
hjälp i ökande grad sågs som ett specifikt och viktigt externt sakområde. 
Men de politiska och rättsliga grunderna för denna politik förblev mycket 
grumliga. 1996 antogs Rådets förordning 1257/96, grundad på den något 
diskutabla rättsliga grunden ”utvecklingssamarbete”, och under hela nittiotalet 
misslyckades ECHO med att agera som ett verkligt självständigt institutionellt 
organ. I detta sammanhang föreslog Europeiska konventet (2002-2003) att en 
specifik fördragsbestämmelse om humanitärt bistånd skulle införas för att stärka 
utvecklingen av en mer professionell och självständig humanitär biståndspolitik 
på EU-nivå. Att det konstitutionella fördraget inte kunde ratificeras innebar 
dock inte slutet för erkännandet av det humanitära biståndets specificitet inom 
ramen för EU:s yttre åtgärder. Lissabonfördraget återanvände helt enkelt de 
humanitära biståndsbestämmelserna i det konstitutionella fördraget. Därutöver 
antog Europeiska kommissionen, Europaparlamentet och rådet gemensamt ”en 
europeisk konsensus gällande humanitärt bistånd” i december 2007. Därmed kan 
också EU:s humanitära bistånd sägas bygga på säker rättslig och politisk grund.
Artikel 214 FEUF kodifierar inte bara EU:s kompetens att agera inom området, 
den understryker också hur viktigt det är att respektera de grundprinciper som härrör 
från internationell humanitär rättspraxis och är en förutsättning för tillämpningen 
av EU:s humanitära verksamhet. Dock skapar också den nya bestämmelsen nya 
utmaningar vad gäller beaktandet av dess principer. Frivilligorganisationer som 
är verksamma inom biståndsområdet har uttryckt viss oro över de politiska 
drivkrafterna bakom grundandet av en europeisk frivilligkår för humanitärt 
bistånd (EVHC) samt integreringen av EU:s biståndspolitik inom den allmänna 
260 Denna rapport grundar sig delvis på: P. Van Elsuwege and J. Orbie, ‘The EU’s Humanitarian 
Aid Policy after Lisbon: Implications of a New Treaty Basis’, in: I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds.),  
EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats and 
Crises (Boston-Leiden: Brill, 2014), 20-45 and J. Orbie, P. Van Elsuwege and F. Bossuyt, 
‘Humanitarian Aid as an Integral Part of the European Union’s External Action: The 
Challenge of Reconciling Coherence and Independence’, 22 Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management 3 (2014), 158-165. Vi riktar ett tack till Christophe Hillion, Inge Govaere, 
Sara Poli, Kathrin Schick, Thomas Henökl och två anonyma bedömare för deras värdefulla 
kommentarer till tidigare versioner av den här rapporten.
67SIEPS 2016:3 Humanitarian aid policy in the EU´s external relations
ramen för EU:s yttre åtgärder och den övergripande krishanteringsstrategin. Från 
organisationernas sida menar man att detta skulle kunna leda till ett ifrågasättande 
av EU:s oberoende när det gäller agerande i humanitära frågor och ha en negativ 
inverkan på dess engagemang för de humanitära principerna.
Det finns i princip tillräckliga garantier för att garantera oberoendet i samband 
med EU:s humanitära operationer och beslutsfattandet inom området styrs 
fortfarande i huvudsak av Generaldirektoratet ECHO inom kommissionen. 
Integreringen av de civila skyddsfunktionerna inom ECHO har förbättrat 
sammanhållningen i EU:s krishantering, och relationerna till Europeiska 
utrikestjänsten (EEAS) verkar inte ha underminerat de humanitära principernas 
grundläggande ställning. Flera problemområden kvarstår dock:
För det första kan trenden mot en mer övergripande krishanteringsstrategi, 
med en ökad aktiv samordnarroll för EEAS, leda till ytterligare institutionella 
spänningar i förhållandet till GD ECHO. En tydlig ansvarsfördelning och 
medvetenhet om det humanitära biståndets betydelse hos alla aktörer är 
avgörande för att säkerställa ett effektivt samarbete både på den politiska nivån 
och på fältet. Det skulle eventuellt underlätta att revidera Förordning 1257/96 
och ”en europeisk konsensus gällande humanitärt bistånd” för att klargöra GD 
ECHOs självständiga och samordnande roll och dess relationer till institutionella 
aktörer som EEAS.
För det andra har väldigt få praktiska framsteg gjorts när det gäller att knyta 
samman katastrof-, återanpassnings- och utvecklingsbistånd. Även inom dessa 
områden är det viktigt att alla inblandade aktörer – såväl i Bryssel som i de olika 
delegationerna – förstår varandras principer, målsättningar och modaliteter, och 
kan enas om ett gemensamt ramverk.
För det tredje finns det politiska och rättsliga hinder för Lissabonfördragets 
målsättning att underlätta integrationen av olika politiska instrument som 
svar på globala katastrofer. Detta illustreras tydligt av de åtgärder som EU 
vidtog i samband med översvämningar i Pakistan 2010, där det tillfälliga 
införandet av handelspreferenser mötte starkt motstånd inom såväl EU som 
Världshandelsorganisationen (WTO).
Sammanfattningsvis kan man konstatera att EU under de senaste tio åren har 
skapat ett starkt rättsligt och politiskt ramverk för biståndspolitiken. EU framstår 
som en central aktör när det gäller att tillhandahålla och samordna humanitär 
hjälp, och man har mycket kraftfullt hävdat de humanitära principerna. 
Vissa problem kvarstår dock vad gäller integreringen av biståndsprogram 
i mer omfattande strategier för katastrofhjälp. Även om ramverket i och 
med Lissabonfördraget innefattar en rad mekanismer avsedda att garantera 
biståndspolitikens ställning i EU, leder trenden mot en mer övergripande 
krishanteringsstrategi vid katastrofsituationer till att de humanitära principerna 
sätts under ökat tryck.
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